CONTENTS 



Page 



I. Introduction 57 



Definition of the Problem and Scope of the Study 57 



II. A Short Chronology of Atomic Control Diplomacy After World War II _ 59 

 Preliminary Agreements on Nuclear Sharing; U.S. Preparations 



To Negotiate 59 



Impasse of Negotiations in the United Nations 60 



The Historical Context of the Negotiations; the Turbulent Post- 

 war Years 60 



III. The Postwar Paradox: Cold War and Internationalism 62 



Preparation for International Control Efforts 62 



Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States 63 



Domestic Control 64 



Hasty Demobilization of U.S. Military Forces 65 



Formulation of U.S. Policy on International Control 66 



Early Efforts 66 



Preparations for Negotiations in the UNAEC 68 



The U.S. Negotiator and Final Steps to Define Policy. _ 69 



Abortive Efforts in the United Nations Toward Control 71 



The U.S. Proposal 71 



The Soviet Proposal 72 



Debate and Impasse 73 



IV. Issues in the Interplay Between Diplomacy and Nuclear Technology. 76 



Significance of Technological Factors for U.S. Policy 76 



The Form and Purposes of International Control 80 



Proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 80 



The Board of Consultants' Position Against Inspection. 80 

 International Ownership and Operation of Dangerous 



Activities. _ 82 



Retention of "Safe" National Activities 84 



Inspection Provisions in the Report 85 



Reactions Among U.S. Policymakers to the Proposals of the 



Board of Consultants 8.6 



Trend Toward Control in U.S. Policy 87 



U.N. Stalemate Over Control and Inspection 88 



Soviet Reaction to Proposed Internationalization 88 



Action by the UNAEC 89 



The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control 93 



The Political Basis for Proceeding by Stages 94 



Insistence by Acheson Committee on Step-by-Step 



Approach 95 



Origins of the Discussion 95 



Final Version — Some Technological Considerations 97 



Inconclusive Treatment of the Transition Issue by UNAEC. 99 



The Issue of Enforcement: Sanctions and the Veto 103 



Determining U.S. Policy on Sanctions 103 



U.S. Policy on the Veto: Its Relation to Enforcement 104 



Political Unacceptability of Veto-Free Control in the Nego- 

 tiations 107 



Recapitulation of the Three Issues of Atomic Control 108 



V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations 110 



Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan 110 



Lack of U.S. Attention to Soviet Requirements 111 



Soviet Calculation of U.S. Position 112 



(55) 



