94 



transition from the existing U.S. control of atomic energy to a system 

 of international control. The issue of these transitional stages involved 

 partly the practical steps by which the international Authority would 

 arrive at its position of complete control over atomic energy, but it 

 also concerned the underlying assumption that this transition would 

 have to proceed in such a way that the control system would be made 

 reliable before it could assume responsibility for the information and 

 facilities associated with the dangerous uses of atomic energy. 



Without jeopardizing its own military security or that of the other 

 nations of the world, thereby fulfilling its responsibility as keeper of 

 the "sacred trust'' over atomic energy, the United States had to deter- 

 mine its policy regarding the sequence and timing of the transfer of 

 information and facilities to an international Authority. For other 

 countries, the issue of the transitional stages raised questions regard- 

 ing whether and when the United States would relinquish its monopoly 

 over atomic energy 7 and thus give up what appeared to be a command- 

 ing military advantage. Thus, U.S. policy had to be framed to satisfy 

 multiple and conflicting purposes. Important related questions for 

 policymakers of the United States and other countries were, when 

 would the United States stop its production of atomic bombs, and 

 what would become of its stockpiles ? 



THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR PROCEEDING BY STAGES 



The concept of stages for the release of information and transfer of 

 facilities had its foundations in early U.S. policy on international con- 

 trol of atomic energy and in those international agreements which com- 

 mitted the United States to seek such control. Initial Administration 

 pronouncements regarding atomic energy included assurances that 

 the "secret" of weapons manufacture would not be released in the ab- 

 sence of international control. In his October 1945 message to Congress, 

 which concentrated primarily on national control. President Truman, 

 in speaking on the problem of international control, pledged that 

 international discussions would "not be concerned with disclosures re- 

 lating to the manufacturing processes leading to the production of 

 the atomic bomb itself," and that they would "constitute an effort to 

 work out arrangements covering the terms under which international 

 collaboration and exchange of information might safely proceed." 

 Although the President did not specifically mention transitional stages, 

 his comments indicate an effort to avoid any implication that the im- 

 pending discussions might lead to dissemination of information on 

 atomic energy, before control of its destructive uses had been achieved. 

 As later developed in U.S. policy, this goal became one of the primary 

 purposes for devising transitional stages. 



The Three Nation Agreed I >eclaration of November 1945 offered an 

 "exchange of fundamental scientific information * * * for peaceful 

 ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate," bul added that much 

 of the information on practical applications of atomic energy would 

 become available "just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards 



"Harry s Truman, "Special Message to the Conpn>ss on Atomic Energy, October 3, 

 I'M.". / ublic Papers of th( President of tin United States, 1945 (Washington, D.C. : u.b. 

 Gove'rnmenl Printing Office, 1961 >, i>. 366. 



