202 



other hand, the Agency provided an arena wherein U.S. and Soviet 

 representatives could meet in an atmosphere where political differ- 

 ences were less pronounced than for other cold war circumstances. 



From the beginning of the IAEA, the United States and the U.S.S.R. 

 as the two principal "have" nations in the world's nuclear com- 

 munity were pushed together in their participation in the Agency's 

 activities by the pressures of the other largely "have-not" nations. 

 These circumstances engendered some mutual interest and the result- 

 ing experience demonstrated the possibilities for cooperation between 

 the two governments in diplomatic, legal, and technical matters relat- 

 ing to nuclear energy. While such cooperation has become common in 

 1972. 171 it was most unusual during the formative years of the IAEA. 

 The IAEA provided a sheltered field wherein member states belong- 

 ing to widely differing world power blocs could cautiously experiment 

 with new relations. On the other hand, the variety of viewpoints and 

 national desires represented among the members of the Agency on 

 occasion led to strained relations within the IAEA's governing bodies 

 and has tended to limit the Agency to a lowest common denominator 

 of inoffensive activities. 



The IAEA has been a useful test-bed to demonstrate a limited form 

 of international inspection, a demonstration that can be important 

 for U.S. interests if international limitations upon armaments are 

 agreed upon. The IAEA, with strong U.S. backing, has demonstrated 

 on a small scale how international safeguards for nuclenr materials 

 can work. Perhaps more important, it has done so without generating 

 any insoluble problem of national sovereignty. Whether the United 

 States and other nations will now be willing to provide the financial 

 and technical support required by the Agency to expand its safeguards 

 functions enough to adequately implement the Nonproliferation 

 Treaty remains to be seen. 



Several specific questions relating to the IAEA are likely to con- 

 front U.S. diplomats and policymakers in the future. These questions 

 can be expected to bear upon : 



(1) Establishing and enforcing international standards and 

 guides for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear 

 power plants, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, and perpetual 

 radioactive waste storage facilities ; 



(2) Establishing and enforcing international regulations for 

 the shipment of highly radioactive materials ; 



(3) Assessment of environmental effects of nuclear facilities 

 located so near to national boundaries that such effects could 

 be expected to extend across national borders ; 



(4) Supplying nuclear fuel materials; 



(5) Providing for the perpetual storage of radioactive wastes 

 from nuclear power ; 



(0) Safeguarding of nuclear fuel materials for commercial 

 nuclear power; 



(7) Possible future relations with the regional nuclear energy 

 agencies of the Soviet bloc nations. 



171 The United States and the U.S.S.R. slimed an agreement on scientific find technological 

 cooperation on May 24. 1072, that poos hoyond the usual eTehantre of Ideas and opens the 

 way to scientific Joint research undertakings and cooperative projects. It estahlished for 

 the first time a U.S. -Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Cf. 

 Claire R. Geler. The U.B.-Boviet Aqrrcmcvt in Science anrl Technology (Washington, P.P. : 

 The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 10, 1972, report No. 

 72-179 SP. 



