106 



the sense of urgency with which Baruch treated the veto question in 

 his opening speech to the UNAEC : 



* * * There must be no veto to protect those who violate 

 their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy 

 for destructive purposes. 



The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to 

 die. The time between violation and preventive action or 

 punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as 

 to the course to be followed. 131 



It is unlikely, however, that these factors alone can account for 

 Baruch's adamant position on penalties and the veto question. Early 

 in the policy deliberations following Baruch's appointment, the elder 

 statesman had raised the possibility to Secretary Byrnes and others 

 that the negotiations of the UNAEC might provide a forum for the 

 attainment of world disarmament, encompassing all weapons. One 

 writer labelled Baruclrs notion as "an expression of his idealism and 

 expansive self-image." 132 although his position was supported by Eber- 

 stadt and Hancock. When Hancock learned that the Secretary of State 

 was not enthusiastic about Baruch's idea, one source describes his reac- 

 tion : "As Hanock sized up the situation, Byrnes was trying to simplify 

 the job by limiting it to atomic energy." 133 The exchange on the subject 

 between Baruch and Byrnes has been described as follows: 



* * * Byrnes would have none of this vision. It would be 

 "a serious mistake," he said, to attempt to cover these other 

 weapons as part of Baruch's present assignment. Baruch was 

 equally strong in response : "The problem of atomic energy is 

 a problem of the hearts of men — no plan so far proposed gives 

 any guarantee of assurance." Only total disarmament offered 

 such a guarantee. Byrnes was unmoved. 134 



News of Baruch's proposal for total disarmament prompted one 

 member of the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy to admon- 

 ish him to "stick to his knitting." l35 Thus, since Baruch's idea of a com- 

 prehensive disarmament proposal had been thwarted, it is understand- 

 able, perhaps, that if his efforts had to be confined to atomic energy, 

 he might seek a control system which would be as secure as possible. 

 by providing "immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who 

 violate the agreements that are reached by the nations." 130 



In addition. Baruch's insistence on removal of the veto as a vital 

 component of the proposed system of punishments may have l>cen 

 prompted by the -rowing U.S. attitude of mistrust of the Soviet 

 Union. The belief was strong that violations most likely would origi- 

 nate with the Soviet Union or one of its allies. Moreover, the Soviet 

 Union's performance during the first months of the United Nations, 

 which was characterized by frequent use of the veto in the Security 

 Council, fortified the impression that Moscow would have recourse 

 to the veto to avoid the consequences of its violations. 137 



*» State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 142-143. 

 "3 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 277. 



Hewlett and Anderson, History of the Atomic Energy Commission, p. 569. 

 ■ Lieberman, The Scorpion mni the Tarantula, p. 290. 

 Hewlett and Anderson, History o) the Atomic Energy Commission, p. o7G. 

 i« State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 138. 



«i During ii..- meetings of the iNAI'c itself, a resolution was Introduced In tbe General 

 Assembly, calling for an investigation of Soviet abuse of the veto. Bechhoefer, Postwar 

 Negotiations, p. 57. 



