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as a byproduct of commercial nuclear power in Europe and the 

 United States. Yet if present estimates for growth of nuclear power 

 are correct, within the decade there will be a marked increase in 

 both the number of nuclear power plants and supporting facilities 

 to be safeguarded and the amounts of material in process, transit, and 

 inventory, factors which would be expected to increase the tempta- 

 tion and opportunities for attempted diversions. U.S. foreign policy 

 toward commercial nuclear energy in Europe can be expected to have 

 some influence on the nature and pace of this future growth, and upon 

 the attitude of the governments involved toward the IAEA and the 

 safeguards system. 



Specific issues of importance in U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's 

 and the 1980's appear to include the following : 



(1) A point-of -no-return decisian: At this time, in 1972, nuclear 

 power, while growing rapidly, is still not a major component of electric- 

 ity supply in either the United States or Europe. If the risks to world 

 peace from potential diversion of nuclear materials cannot adequate- 

 ly be controlled by safeguards, there may still be time to deemphasize 

 nuclear power despite the economic loss of much of the past national 

 investments in bringing nuclear power to its present state. Within 

 a .few years, however, the nations of the world will pass a point of 

 no return beyond which a decision to abandon or limit nuclear power 

 will no longer be a njanageable policy alternative. At issue for U.S. 

 foreign policy is a final decisive international risk-versus-benefit 

 analysis for nuclear power in terms of dangers to* world peace from 

 diversion of materials to use in clandestine weapons. 



(2) U.S. support for IAEA safeguards : The present demonstra- 

 tion of IAEA safeguards would not have been possible without U.S. 

 support and cooperation. But what of preparing the IAEA to apply 

 its safeguards systems to commercial nuclear power throughout the 

 world ? For U.S. diplomacy there are interacting foreign and domes- 

 tic considerations. On the one hand, strong past U.S. support would 

 suggest that future U.S. support should be expanded so that the 

 Agency can prepare for the anticipated rapid, worldwide growth in 

 the use of nuclear power. On the other hand, domestic demands for 

 funds and changing attitudes toward foreign aid seem likely to make 

 such expansion difficult. In these circumstances, it would seem that 

 U.S. diplomacy has a two-pronged responsibility for the future of 

 this international control of a potentially dangerous technological 

 product. First, it will have to help assure conditions for the IAEA 

 adequately to perform its safeguards function. Second, it will have 

 to help generate the domestic understanding and commitment needed 

 to assure adequate U.S. support. 



Another related function for U.S. diplomacy is likely to be that of 

 working to determine the future shape, scale, and balance of the 

 IAEA activities. If only the safeguards function expands, then bit by 

 bit other Agency functions may atrophy so that ultimately the IAEA 

 may become primarily a safeguards agency. This condition may or 

 may not be m the ultimate U.S. interest. IAEA concentration on 

 safeguards should improve the management and effectiveness of this 

 function. However, the Nonproliferation Treaty offered non- weapons 

 states the promise of benefits from nuclear energy. Could this promise 

 be adequately fulfilled by an international agency whose technical 



