253 



By early 1964, the AEC and Euratom had signed two deferred pay- 

 ment agreements for two Italian projects, and during that year a third 

 arrangement was concluded with Euratom for fuel for a French nu- 

 clear powerplant. 291 



PRICING URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICE 



A potential divergence between domestic and foreign policy for 

 nuclear energy arose in 1971 following two successive increases in the 

 AEC price for uranium enrichment. The Joint Committee on Atomic 

 Energy held hearings at which AEC Commissioner Ramey dissented 

 from this price increase. 292 He argued for a policy of stability in 

 pricing to retain the U.S. position as a fuel supplier, and to discourage 

 foreign construction of enrichment plants. He said:* 93 



Because of the AEC's unique position as the supplier of enriching services, to 

 the United States and most of the free world, I believe it has a responsibility 

 to maintain a stable price for the vital enrichment services which domestic 

 and foreign utilities and equipment companies must purchase. . ' , • l ! 



. . . : the inteijnatiqijial implicatipns Qf r tbe ; price increase cap be, serious. Our 

 foreign customers, botjh present and potential, are going to be concerned by the 

 two price increases in rapid Succession. They are certainly going to want an 

 alternative 'Supply of enriching services. This will serve to' reduce the demand 

 on. our .capacity and to ^further the construction of- enrichment plants in other 

 countries, . : r . ; \ ' ' ■ . . r 



While this. latter faction is already underway or being seriously considered in 

 several countries, this proposed pricing action will discourage either the use 

 ef United States technology of a partnership with the United States rh con- 

 structing the new capacity. A proliferation of enrichment facilities abroad is 

 not in anybody|s best interest. ...... i- .--..•.,. 



So domestic policy decisions to increase the charge for enrichment had 

 unfavorable implications for U.S. foreign policy. - . 



Apropos of foreign policy, the AEC did not consult the State De- 

 partment about these pricing actions. An AEC representative advised 

 the Joint Committee that it was a domestic decision : 294 



. . ^. This was a decision that was taken by the Atomic Energy Commission, 

 and the State Department was not consulted in advance. I think that while 

 this is a very important consideration, the policy we followed is to establish 

 our price primarily on the basis of the whole power industry, of which the do- 

 mestic industry is the greater part, and then try to treat everybody on a non- 

 discriminatory basis. While thought was given to the implications on the foreign 

 business, we did not consult outside of the agency on this subject. 



The AEC did, however, inform the Department of State shortly 

 before announcing the price increases so that the news could be "prop- 

 erly communicated to our embassies and our customers abroad." 295 



European Opposition to U.S. Enrichment Monopoly 



Through the late 1960's, whether Europe might produce its own en- 

 riched uranium for nuclear power was a speculative but not imminent 

 question. During this time the French and the British sought to 

 develop commercially competitive nuclear powerplants fueled with 

 natural uranium. While the joint U.S. -Euratom program did result 



281 TT.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress, J96i (Washington, D.C. : 

 U.S. Government Printing Office. 1965), p. 202. 



283 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Uranium Enrichment 

 Pricing Criteria, on. cit., p. 13. 



288 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 



284 Ibid., n. 21. 

 286 Loc. cit. 



