275 



U.S. SUPPORT OF THE SAFEGUARDS COMMITTEE 



The United States has consistently supported the Safeguards Com- 

 mittee's work. Addressing the 14th session of the IAEA's General 

 Conference in September 1970, AEC Chairman Seaborg said that the 

 United States was very satisfied with the work of the Committee in 

 formulating principles, and in providing for independent verification 

 by the Agency. He urged that the Agency should make full use of 

 national systems in carrying out safeguards. Chairman Seaborg em- 

 phasized U.S. desire for these principles and for their constructive 

 refinement : 342 



We believe, on the basis of our direct experience with IAEA safeguards, that 

 they are not intrusive and will not interfere with the economical operation of 

 plants or the security of proprietary information. At the same time, we strongly 

 favor the continuing evolution of the IAEA safeguards system to take full 

 advantage of all technical advances permitting improved efficiency of safeguards. 



THE SOVIET VIEW 



The Soviet Union also supported the work of the Safeguards Com- 

 mittee. Professor I. D. Morokhov, 343 commented on the Committee's 

 recommendations as follows : 344 



Its recommendations on the content of the agreements concerning the Agency's 

 supervision of the nuclear activities of non-nuclear- weapons States will enable 

 the Agency effectively to discharge its functions under the Treaty, on the basis 

 of a judicious combination of national safeguards systems and independent 

 verifications by the Agency. The procedures for the conduct of inspections, desig- 

 nation of inspectors and settlement of disputes, which the Committee has worked 

 out, take full account of the sovereign rights of States. 



The Committee's recommendations ensure protection of the industrial and 

 commercial interests of States by providing for communication to the Agency 

 of only the minimum of data on the nuclear activities of a State necessary for 

 safeguards purposes and by requiring the Agency to treat as strictly confidential 

 such commercial and industrial information of importance to States as may come 

 into its possession in connection with safeguards. 



Criticisms of IAEA Safeguards 



Critics have contended it has not been proved that IAEA will be 

 able to perform adequately the inspection role assigned to it in the 

 Treaty. They challenge the reliability of estimates of the costs to 

 sufficiently strengthen the IAEA to fulfill its inspection role and 

 they ask what share of the increased burden the United States might 

 be asked to underwrite. 



Even with the successful application of inspection procedures by 

 the IAEA on declared peaceful nuclear activities, critics contend that 

 a nation could still manufacture nuclear weapons in secret. Could a 

 nation which desires to produce weapons hide some fissionable ma- 

 terial before the inauguration of the safeguards? Or could it secretly 

 build separate facilities to produce fissionable material and to fabri- 

 cate weapons which could not be detected by the circumscribed visits 

 of IAEA inspectors? Could illicit facilities be detected without gen- 

 eral inspection of the entire countryside? Has a feasible way been 

 found to detect hidden stockpiles of fissionable material ? These ques- 

 tions await answers. 



343 "General Conference of the International Atomic Ene^v Agencv holds 14th session 

 at Vienna," State Department Bulletin, vol. 63 (October 26, 1970), p. 487. 



"» First Deputy Chairman of the U.S S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic 

 Energy and representative from the U.S. S.R. on the IAEA Board of Governors. 



*" I. D. Morokhov. "Safeguards : Five Views," International Atomic Energy Agency 

 Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), pp. 7-9. 



