78 



Opinions varied within the Administration as to the length of time 

 necessary for the Soviet Union to develop an atomic weapon. As early 

 as 1D4T). the question was raised in Administration circles. During a 

 meeting of Stimson's Interim Committee, a memorandum was cited 

 which reflected the estimate by Bush and Conant that it would be 3 

 to 4 years before the Soviets could develop an atomic weapon. General 

 Groves' estimate is described as follows: ''Taking a very low view of 

 Russian ability, he considered 20 years a much likelier figure." 43 

 Conant called this figure "highly unsafe." 



The Acheson-Lilienthal report noted the speculative nature of esti- 

 mates of this kind. In order to assess a technological situation accu- 

 rately, the report contended, it was necessary to have a knowledge of 

 the progress of foreign development. Such knowledge, of course, was 

 not then forthcoming. But on balance, the report seemed to minimize 

 the possibility of an imminent acquisition of atomic weapons by other 

 countries. The Consultants touched on this question insofar as it re- 

 lated to how much a rival effort would be accelerated by the release 

 of U.S. information. Even with the release of purely theoretical in- 

 formation, according to the Consultants, "a major program, surely 

 lasting many years, is required for the actual production of atomic 

 weapons." 44 It might be inferred from this statement that the Con- 

 sultants' view of rival efforts, without access to theoretical informa- 

 tion, could hardly have been an imminent cause for alarm to U.S. 

 policymakers. 



One high Administration view, even more explicit regarding esti- 

 mates of Russia's ability to develop its own bomb, was conveyed to the 

 U.S. negotiating team. Hancock kept a record of a meeting which he 

 attended between Byrnes and Baruch, which states : 



Mr. Byrnes briefly reviewed his impression that the Rus- 

 sians don't know much about atomic energy or its use in 

 bombs. Dr. Conant got no facts regarding it while he was in 

 Russia and the assumption is that they know nothing.' 



While it is difficult to appraise the extent to which these assessments 

 of Soviet nuclear development influenced U.S. policy, one might infer 

 from the course and outcome of the negotiations that these considera- 

 tions had weight. Considering the fact that differing estimates were 

 made regarding Soviet atomic capabilities, it is possible to note an 

 example of one problem which can arise when diplomacy is depend- 

 ent upon science and technology. Policymakers do not always receive" 

 a technological assessment to which all members of the scientific com- 

 munity agree. A wide divergence only complicates the diplomat's task. 

 If. for example, there is no clear consensus that an imminent danger 

 exists, the diplomat will probably tend to be guided by counsels of 

 compromise rather than urgency. And perhaps he should be — but it 

 must also be noted that the counsels of urgency could be right, ami that 

 in the present instance it was the conservative estimates of General 

 Groves which turned out to be the furthest from the true situation. 



An equally thorny political factor which would enter into the dis- 



11 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 3. r >4. 



11 state Department, "Acheson Llllentbal Report," p. 51. 



** Lleberman, The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, p. 274. Hancock may have been referring 

 ti. Conant's trip t" Russia with Byrnes, for the meetings which resulted in the Moscow 

 Declaration. Ibid., pp. iog-107. 



