281 



As for Euratom, he underscored the concern of its member 

 nations : ** 



Our Euratom friends were very concerned that Euratom safeguards not dis- 

 appear, the Euratom structure not disappear, as a result of any IAEA safeguards 

 agreement. They opposed, for example, a provision which on its face would seem 

 the simplest, which said that this treaty shall be safeguarded by the IAEA ; that 

 is, IAEA safeguards shall be applicable to non-nuclear activities. 



Our allies opposed that, and they opposed it with good reason. They opposed 

 it because they didn't want a duplicative set of safeguards, because if there were 

 such, the Euratom safeguards themselves might disappear as unnecessary. 



U.S. policy, Mr. Fisher went on to say, was that we did not wish to be 

 a party to any attempt to undermine the structure of Euratom in terms 

 of national programs. mo 



EURATOM CONCERN 



Euratom members have been disturbed over the Nonproliferation 

 Treaty. 891 One concern has been expressed that Euratom's inspection 

 system, which has been a major factor in binding the members to- 

 gether, would lose substance if it is subordinated to the inspection sys- 

 tem of the IAEA. Other observers had hoped that were Euratom to be 

 given an inspection role under the Treaty it would give the organiza- 

 tion a needed boost. As finally adopted, the Treaty does not recognize 

 Euratom by name, but does permit nations or groups of nations to 

 enter into inspection arrangements with the IAEA. This provision has 

 been interpreted as permitting the IAEA to enter an agreement with 

 Euratom giving Euratom's inspection system some role. 



Another concern of members of Euratom is that if IAEA safeguards 

 were applied, it would result in a discriminatory control system within 

 the Euratom community, and that it would hinder the creation of a 

 European nuclear industry. Because France as a nuclear weapons 

 power would not be subject to inspection under the Treaty, other Eura- 

 tom members feared this exemption might result in a displacement of 

 nuclear research and industry from the controlled members to France, 

 or that the Treaty would impede joint nuclear activities involving 

 France and other states. ; 



A State Department memorandum prepared in January 1969 for 

 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained that the safeguards 

 article was incorporated in the final drafts of the Treaty only after 

 consultation by the United States with its Euratom allies and with 

 the Commission of the European Communities. The three Euratom 

 members who had signed the Treaty did not consider that there was 

 any incompatibility between the goals of nonproliferation and Eura- 

 tom. It was their position that the safeguards provided in the Treaty' 

 would be the subject of agreements to be concluded with the IAEA 

 and that to avoid the possibility of incompatibilities with the provi- 

 sions of the Euratom treaty, safeguards must be defined so that the 

 rights and obligations of the member states and the Community remain 

 intact. The Euratom members which had signed the Nonproliferation 



858 Ibid., p. 61. 



880 Loc. clt. 



an Much of the following discussion of the impact of NPT uDon Euratom draws heavily 

 SES. a „ rep c rt 0f E1 r? n C - Co i lip , r - Analyst in U.S. Foreign Policy, of the then Legislative 

 Reference Service Library of Congress, entitled "Effects of -the Nonproliferation Treaty 

 £«j£,f r £ at i i0 M al In |*ltution8.*' It is reprinted in U.S., Congress, Senate. Committee on 

 462^475 Relations ' Heartn 08> Nonproliferation Treaty, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, pp. 



