568 



TABLE 8.-T0TAL PROJECTED U.S. EXPORTS TO EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION (UNDER VARYING 



CONDITIONS) 



[Millions of U.S. dollars] 



1972, if 1973. if 1973, if 1978, if 1978, if 

 trade trade trade trade trade 

 1972 were is were is is 

 actual Classifi- "normal- "main- "normal- "main- "normal- 

 exports cation ized" tained" ized" tained" ized" 



High. 



Total Eastern Europe/U.S.S.R 816.45 Middle. 



Low 



1,272.83 

 1," 10107" 



530.03 1,441.60 

 "439."i6"Tl819T 



964. 04 

 588" 52" 



High 804.61 



Eastern Europe 269.84 Middle. 736.03 



Low 654.83 



U.S.S.R.' 2 546.61 



High 468.62 



Middle 



Low 448.24 



348. 64 

 309. 50 

 273. 64 



181.79 



"165." 46" 



905. 97 

 806. 94 

 696. 40 



535. 63 



487.51" 



356. 65 

 232.12" 



2,601.13 

 "l," 572" 34 



607.39 1,500.32 

 464. 52 1, 238. 54 

 356. 40 888. 42 



1,050.81 

 "683.92 



1 Projections exclude any possible grain deals of the type concluded in July 1972, whose nature and causes prevent them 

 from being estimated. 

 - 2 1972 actual includes grain. 



Source: Office of East-West Trade Analyssis, Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce. 



This estimate suggests a trade turnover of over $5 billion in 1978 and 

 presumably larger by 1980. If U.S.-Chinese trade is added to this 

 figure, 82 total U.S. trade with Communist countries might exceed S7 

 billion by the end of this decade. 



The basis for such optimistic estimates appears to be the large import 

 requirements of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries for 

 Western goods and services. A 1973 estimate by a Soviet observer con- 

 firms that these requirements are substantial. The Soviet projection 

 placed import requirements in 1980 (from Western industrial coun- 

 tries) at $7-7.5 billion for the U.S.S.R. and $17-18 billion for all of 

 the nations of Comecon, 83 also from Western industrial countries. 



I Iowever. in 1972 the Soviet t rade deficit with the United States was 

 si.Vj million (Soviet imports totaled sr> 1 7 million, while exports were 

 only * ( .)~> million). It is unlikely that t he Soviets will be able or willing 

 to maintain such deficits in future trade 1 with the United States. Thus. 

 in order to rapidly expand their trade with the United States, the 

 Soviets must either increase their commodity exports or offset the im- 

 balance with invisible trade earnings from tourism, gold sales and 

 shipping, or with credits from the Export-Import Bank or private 

 commercial banks. 



In assessing these projections, it i^ best to concentrate on Soviet 

 ability to export to the United States, because Soviet dollar earnings 

 will be a major constraint on future trade. Soviet dollar earnings from 

 tourism, shipping, and gold sales are likely to grow in the next few 

 years: but without changes in present policies, these items may add 

 only several hundred million < lobars to Soviet hard-currency holdings. 

 I f the Soviet I nion adopts a new policy of maximizing income in dol- 

 lars from gold sales, tourism, and shipping, annual earnings of nearly 

 $r>00 million do not seem unattainable. This amount would involve 



83 James B. Stopanck oltos estimates of IT. S. -Chinese trade In 19SO of S. r >00 million to 

 si billion. Sino-Amertcan Trade (Washington, D.C. : Library of Congress. Congressional 

 Research Service, May 1973). p, 54, 



93 X, Shmelev, "Novye gorlzonty ekonomichesklkh sviazey" (New Horizons of Economic 

 Relations), Mirovata ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 1. January 1973, p. 13. 



