Vietnam war and later the Mansfield amendment 

 caused a decrease in basic research to about half 

 its previous level. Since 1974, this trend has re- 

 versed and the Army states that the target level of 

 50 percent in-house/50 percent contract has almost 

 been reached. -i^ 



Army — Current Trends 



The Army's estimated obligations for basic re- 

 search in fiscal year 1977 are $40.1 million — $13.7 

 million in the life sciences, $2.8 million in psy- 

 chology, $5.7 million in the physical sciences, 

 $5.0 million in environmental sciences, $3.1 mil- 

 lion in mathematics, $9.7 million in engineering, 

 and $0.1 million in the social sciences.44 it runs 32 

 Government-operated R&D laboratories/facilities. 

 Contracts or grants are awarded by several Army 

 organizations — the Army Research Institute for 

 the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the Army 

 Medical Research and Development Command, 

 the Army Research Office, and in-house laborato- 

 ries. Proposals for contracts or grants are re- 

 viewed by in-house scientific personnel and by 

 outside scientific peers. In addition the Army 

 supports a small amount of research in foreign 

 countries.'''' 



In summary, for the first half-century the Army 

 conducted research which greatly benefited the 

 civilian sector as well as prepared the military for 

 a defensive war, which fortunately they never had 

 to fight. Research to improve Army materiel was 

 generally neglected, and, as a result, the Union 

 Army was not able to take full advantage of the 

 industrial superiority of the North. In the second 

 half-century. Army research was relevant but, 

 except for that of the Medical Department, inade- 

 quate. Hence, at the onset of World War 1 most 

 Army technology was distinctly inferior to that of 

 our European allies and enemies. From World 

 War I to World 11 the research effort was small 

 and the emphasis was on standardization. During 

 World War II, the military benefited from the 

 massive contributions of the NDRC and OSRD. 

 Since World War II there has been a determined 

 effort never again to be caught unprepared. 



Air Force — Early History 



The Air Force may be said to have had its gen- 

 esis in the Army Topological Engineers, who tried 

 unsuccessfully to make observation balloons of 

 service to the Army during the Civil War. They 

 passed the buck to the Quartermaster Corps, who 



in turn passed it to the Corps of Engineers, who 

 tried to pass it to the Signal Service. When the 

 Signal Service refused to accept the responsibility, 

 the Army temporarily dropped aeronautics.-*^ 



After the Civil War the Signal Service was made 

 responsible for aeronautics but continued to neg- 

 lect it in favor of meteorology. 47 However, in 1890 

 the Signal Service lost meteorology research to the 

 Weather Bureau and became the Signal Corps. At 

 this time the Signal Corps revived investigation in 

 aeronautics. By 1908 the Corps had experimented 

 with observation balloons and contributed to the 

 development of Langley's aerodrome, a dirigible, 

 and an airplane. Until the formation of a separate 

 Air Service in 1918, aviation received the major 

 part of the research funds allotted to the Signal 

 Corps. However, testimony before the Congress in 

 1913 revealed that whereas Germany had spent $28 

 million on aviation, and France $22 million, the 

 U.S. had spent only $435,000. It was apparent that 

 we were technically behind our European allies 

 and our enemies, even at the end of World War 



1 48 



During the 1920's, the Army General Staff want- 

 ed to concentrate on the standardization of mate- 

 riel rather than on its improvement. When the Air 

 Service became the Air Corps in 1926, they turned 

 to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronau- 

 tics (NACA) and the Bureau of Standards for basic 

 research. Industry used the results of NACA's 

 basic research, but the Air Corps did not get funds 

 or authority from the General Staff to encourage 

 rapid development through purchases of advanced 

 aircraft. 



Air Force — World War II 



Alfred Goldberg summarized the situation as 

 the United States entered World War II as fol- 

 lows: 



. . . the planes themselves were inferior. The 

 Spitfire and the Hurricane of the RAF and the 

 Messerschmitt 109 of the Luftwaffe could fly 

 faster and higher than the latest model P-36 and 

 carried more armament. The German attack 

 bombers — the Junkers 87 Stuka and the Junkers 

 88 — outclassed the A- 17 in every respect. Only 

 the B-17 was superior to the best British and 

 German bombers of the time.-'^ 



••Mrmy communiciilion lo NSB statT. April 1977. 

 ^Federal Funds. Vol. X.XVl, N.SI- 77-317. TahleC-34. 

 ■'"'Army communication lo N.SB slaff. April 1977. 



328 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 



•^Dupree, p. 128. 



"^Reingold, pp. 45-51. 



■•^Ibid., p. 102, quoting from Terrett. The Emergency, p. iO. 



•'''Goldberg, Alfred, A History of the United States Air 

 Force. 1907- 1957 (D. Van Noslrand Co.: Princeton, 1957), p. 

 45. 



