The effectiveness of the OSRD's mobilization 

 of science was impressive, and the Navy recog- 

 nized the opportunity which it had missed before 

 the war. In his report to the President for fiscal 

 year 1944, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal said, 

 "... It follows, therefore, if we are to be scien- 

 tifically prepared for war, that preparation must 

 take place before, not after, the outbreak of hostil- 

 ities." In May 1945 he signed a directive: 

 ■'. . . there is hereby established, in the Office of 

 the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of Research 

 and Inventions. . . ."^^ 



One year later this became the Office of Naval 

 Research (ONR) under a naval officer with a civil- 

 ian deputy and a naval deputy. Both naval officers 

 were to be technical specialists, one a specialist in 

 ships and the other in aircraft. 



The act establishing ONR provided that the 

 Naval Research Advisory Committee advise on its 

 policies and programs.'''* Robert D. Conrad is cred- 

 ited with being the architect of ONR's early policy 

 of supporting a very broad program of contract 

 basic research because he saw the Navy's interests 

 and requirements as being very broad. Although 

 concern over accepting Government sponsorship 

 of its research was felt initially in academia, this 

 dissipated rapidly and a good working relationship 

 developed. 



I may sum upONR's contribution in this impor- 

 tant field of administration by noting that, by 

 the competence of its personnel, and by its 

 imaginativeness, ONR established a new kind 

 of relationship between government offices and 

 laboratories and the scholarly community, in 

 which both have worked together for the ad- 

 vancement of science and technology and the 

 improvement of the Navy's capabilities for na- 

 tional defense. 95 



Navy — Current Trends 



Estimated obligations for Navy basic research in 

 1977 are $115.8 million — $42.7 million in environ- 

 mental sciences, $29.9 million in physical sciences, 

 $17.2 million in engineering, $12.9 million in life 

 sciences, $9.0 million in mathematics and comput- 

 er sciences, $2.7 million in psychology, and $1.4 

 million in social sciences. 



The Navy now operates 24 R&D laboratories/ 

 facilities and has two Government-Owned Con- 

 tractor-Operated (GOCO) laboratories and one 



'''Tyler, C. L., "The Relations Between the Military Serv- 

 ices and Science in the National Security Piogram." in Weyl, 

 F. J. (ed.), Reseurcb in the Service of Nationul Purpose (ONR: 

 Washington, D.C. 1966), p. 4. Hereinafter referred to as Weyl 



'«Weyl. pp. .V4. 



''^John S. Foster, Jr.. DDR&E, in Weyl, p. 1 1 . 



Federal Contract Research Center (FCRC— 

 called an FFRDC by NSF), fhe Center for Naval 

 Analyses. Fifteen of the R&D laboratories are 

 under the Director of Naval Laboratories (DNL). 

 These serve the systems commands which have 

 replaced the materiel bureaus, and most of their 

 work is development. Each of these laboratories 

 receives relatively small funding for basic and ap- 

 plied research from one or more system commands 

 and also from the DNL. Funds from the DNL are 

 used at the laboratory director's discretion, their 

 use being reported to the DNL at the end of the 

 year. His evaluation of these reports is used in 

 apportioning the following year's allocation. Funds 

 from the system commands are more likely to have 

 their use specified. The Naval Research Laborato- 

 ry is under the Chief of Naval Research and has a 

 much larger research program with a big basic re- 

 search component. ''f' 



Summary 



The Navy began its research with programs in 

 exploration, astronomy, oceanography, and ord- 

 nance. These areas have been of long-term signifi- 

 cance to the Navy, since it must be able to travel 

 and fight anywhere on the world's oceans. Only 

 ordnance research had much immediate use to the- 

 Navy in the Civil War. By World War I the U.S. 

 had an outstanding fleet, using knowledge both 

 from Europe and from some U.S. research related 

 to ships and ordnance. The chief naval threat of 

 the war, however, was the submarine and the 

 U.S., lacking knowledge of the ocean as an acous- 

 tical path, was initially hampered in conducting an- 

 tisubmarine warfare. An active research program 

 applicable to countering this threat was not started 

 until after the war began. 



Between World Wars I and 11, the U.S. neglect- 

 ed research in ordnance and aircraft and, conse- 

 quently, at the start of World War II, our technolo- 

 gy lagged behind that of the enemy in many re- 

 spects. Neither the Army nor Navy was ready for 

 the war which was to be fought. 



Historians may differ as to the reasons why 

 with all its remarkable scientific advances the 

 United States lagged so dangerously in the de- 

 velopment of weapons, but none will deny the 

 fact.'''' ... It was apparent to a few key sci- 

 entists in the spring of 1940 that the United 

 States was in imminent danger of being forced 

 into a war for which the country was patheti- 

 cally unprepared from the standpoint of new 



'*'Comnninicalions from Navy to NSB staff. April-July. 



1977. 



''^Stewart, p. }. 



334 



COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 



