Conclusion 



The wartime measures to harness science to the 

 war effort were ineffective during the Civil War 

 probably because the country lacked scientific and 

 technical sophistication. They were fairly effec- 

 tive in World War I, a measure of how much our 

 talents had improved. But after World War I the 

 Government's research efforts faded rapidly, es- 

 pecially those in support of the military. World 

 War II was a different story; the best scientists 

 had to be mobilized to win the war and this lesson 

 was not immediately forgotten. The Office of 

 Naval Research (ONR), the AEC, the National 

 Institutes of Health (NIH), and NSF brought 

 about a new level of Government support for ba- 

 sic research. And when the effort lagged a little, 

 the country was shaken by the news of Sputnik; 

 science again became a major public concern and 

 basic research support reached unprecedented 

 levels. 



The Government surveys provided informa- 

 tion and suggestions on which action could be 

 based. Some surveys recognized the need for a 

 centralized research effort, but no action of con- 

 sequence was taken until the Bush Report and the 

 Steelman Report, both of which emphasized the 

 importance of basic research to the national in- 

 terest. The recommendations in these reports 

 brought about the creation of NSF and must have 

 given added impetus to the already existing agen- 

 cy programs in the interim. 



Department of Defense 



Army — Early History 



The Army was the first agency to undertake a 

 major basic research task for the Government, 

 the Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804-1806. 

 When President Jefferson proposed an expedition 

 to explore the Missouri River, he took vigorous 

 steps to insure that the expedition would empha- 

 size scientific investigation. He sent Captain Lew- 

 is to the American Philosophical Society in Phila- 

 delphia for special training in scientific observa- 

 tions, and provided instruments for the expedi- 

 tion. Furthermore, he issued detailed instructions 

 on making astronomical observations, collecting 

 natural history specimens, observing the Indians, 

 and keeping records. The observations recorded 

 by the expedition were not published in any form 

 until 1814 nor reproduced until 1904. The speci- 

 mens collected went to England to be described, 

 but not until 1814. Although the findings of the 

 expedition were significant, there was no scientific 



organization in the Government to make proper 

 use of the data collected.''' 



The Corps of Engineers. Additionally, President 

 Jefferson provided the Army with the first cadre of 

 Government-trained scientists by creating a Corps 

 of Engineers and a Military Academy, at West 

 Point. 1^ These measures provided the Army with 

 officers schooled in mathematics and astronomy in 

 order to make them competent surveyors and topog- 

 raphers. These specialists eventually became the 

 Corps of Topological Engineers, and also served 

 as explorers. For 50 years their expeditions not 

 only helped achieve military and political goals but 

 also advanced our knowledge in the natural sci- 

 ences. 



Although the Corps of Topological Engineers 

 provided significant service to the Nation in 

 peacetime, their specialty was not applicable to 

 wartime concerns. Because of their separate 

 goals, the Corps and the operating Army both 

 found working together difficult.!'' The Corps of 

 Engineers, which had separated from the Corps 

 of Topological Engineers, did some basic research 

 in hydraulics in connection with their peacetime 

 civil duties, but apparently they did no research 

 on wartime materiel (e.g., steel for rails). When 

 the war ended the Engineers were reunited with 

 the Topological Engineers and they continued civil 

 pursuits. 



Ordnance Department. Another group under the 

 War Department that was entirely independent of 

 the operating Army was the Ordnance Depart- 

 ment, established in 1812."^ In this Department, 

 basic research was performed as part of the pro- 

 curement function, and important advances in the 

 design and founding of cast iron cannons were 

 made as the result of studies in interior ballistics, 

 the chemical and physical properties of iron, and 

 the effect of grain size on the rate of combustion 

 of gunpower.'^ However, the Department was 

 often reluctant to foster and accept new ideas. 

 For example, in a program based on the procure- 

 ment of cast iron cannons there apparently was 

 no research on steel cannons, which were gaining 

 wide acceptance in Europe. Furthermore, the 

 Department took 14 years to accept T. J. Rod- 

 man's improved cast iron cannon (but it eventually 

 did so in 1859). After the Civil War, Ordnance was 

 severely criticized by Congress for apparently re- 



I'Dupree, p. 28. 



i^bid.. p. 29. 



I'Ibid.. pp. 134-135. 



"*Reingold, Nathan, "Science and the United States Army," 

 (unpublished monograph prepared for the National Science 

 Foundation, c. 1955). pp. 4-5, 23. Hereinafter referred to as 

 Reingold 



'''Reingold, pp. 24-25. Dupree. pp. 126-127 



COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 325 



