I, the Signal Corps was particularly aggressive in 

 seeking scientific help. It persuaded Robert Milli- 

 kin, the head of the Division of Physics, Mathe- 

 matics, Astronomy and Geophysics in the newly 

 formed National Research Council, to accept a 

 commission in the Corps. He recruited scientists, 

 supervised the revival of meteorological work, in- 

 stituted a program of research on photography, 

 and continued research on wireless and the detec- 

 tion of aircraft.'''* 



Chemical Warfare Service. When chemical war- 

 fare was introduced during World War I, the Bu- 

 reau of Mines developed defense measures 

 against it and a Chemical Warfare Service was 

 created in the War Department. Some original 

 work was accomplished here in the final months 

 of the war. This research contributed to the un- 

 derstanding of the effects of chemical weapons 

 and to the development of defenses against them. 

 New offensive chemical agents were also synthe- 

 sized. 35 



Army— World War I to World War II 



The biggest change in Army research between 

 World Wars I and II was the development of a 

 strong General Staff which had authority over the 

 technical corps and the operating Army as well. 

 This had the positive efi'ect of tying development 

 to the needs of the potential user, but it had a 

 negative effect on research. Although basic and 

 applied research in metallurgy continued at Wa- 

 tertown, and the Chemical Warfare Service con- 

 tinued research on a small scale at the Edgewood 

 Arsenal, almost all research and development for 

 the entire period was devoted to standardization, 

 and contacts with scientists in the universities 

 were extremely limited.''^ Vannevar Bush says of 

 this period: 



It is truly remarkable that the Services were 

 able to accomplish as much as they did in the 

 face of the tremendous obstacles which beset 

 them on every hand in the peacetime years. 

 The fundamental difficulty, of course, lay in the 

 attitude of the American people toward pre- 

 paredness for war." 



Army— World War II 



In 1940, when scientific mobilization began with 

 the creation of the completely independent Nation- 

 al Defense Research Committee (NDRC) to aid in 



the defense eiTort, the War Department began to 

 expand research again. Moreover, during the Sec- 

 ond World War, when funds flowed freely from 

 Congress to the military, the Army was finally able 

 to capitalize on the civilian research potential. In 

 fact, the success of the wartime research changed 

 the status of scientific research within the Army 

 from a peripheral activity to a necessity central to 

 military planning. 3** 



Army research increased and improved during 

 World War II, and one project the Army handled, 

 although it did not initiate it, was the successful 

 development of the atomic bomb, under the Man- 

 hattan District. However, the highlight of this pe- 

 riod was the effectiveness of the NDRC and the 

 OSRD. But the wartime scale of OSRD effort 

 could not be maintained,-''* and at the end of 1944 it 

 began self-demobilization, which was largely com- 

 pleted by January 1946. -^'i The Deputy Director of 

 OSRD wrote: 



If, unhappily, there should be another war, 

 there should be no need for another OSRD. It 

 will be needed only if there is a large deficit of 

 military research such as existed in 1940.41 



Thus the need for continuing military research 

 was recognized. The Army's current policy on 

 research is illustrative of the new emphasis on 

 research that was fostered during World War II: 

 To maintain a strong and progressive research 

 core by conducting a broad and continuing pro- 

 gram, including an adequate in-house capabili- 

 ty. .. . (and to] Maintain effective contact 

 between the Department of the Army and sci- 

 entists. . . .'*2 



Army— Post-World War II 



Following the war most Army laboratories were 

 conducting research programs in-house, only 

 augmenting this work by contracting with outside 

 laboratories. This situation continued, with in- 

 creasing emphasis on basic research, until 1951, 

 when the Chief of Ordnance, who was responsi- 

 ble for 60 percent of the Army's R&D program, 

 centralized his contractual basic research program 

 at Durham, N.C. In 1961, this office became the 

 Army Research Office and assumed responsibili- 

 ty for all Army research. Basic research contin- 

 ued to grow until 1964, when the impact of the 



MDupree, pp. .113-314; Reingold, pp. 95-96. 



"Dupree, pp. 319- .322; Reingold, pp. 106-108. 



"■Dupree, pp. 331-332; Reingold, pp. 110-117. 



"Bush. Vannevar, Endless Horizons (Public Affairs Press: 

 Washington, D.C.. 1946), p. 83. Hereinafter referred to as Bush 

 II. 



'"Reingold. p. 119. 



'■'Bush, Vannevar. Modern Arms and Free Men (MIT tYess: 

 Cambridge. 1968), foreward. Hereinafter referred to as Bush HI; 

 Pizer, Vernon, The United States Army (Praeger: New York. 

 1967), pp. 2.5-26. 



•'OStewart, pp. 299-313. 



"'Ibid., p. .325. 



■•-See Part I for a complete statement of Army research policy. 



COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 327 



