1498 



technical advice on national security matters which can give the President a 

 different perspective than what he gets from the Pentagon, which is required 

 by law to look at national security from one and only one point of view, namely 

 that of the application of force in furtherance of the security interests of the 

 U.S. Alternatives to force are not lilcely to receive sufficient attention in this 

 perspective."^ 



And David Beckler (Assistant to the President, National Academy 

 of Sciences), sees in the action a reduced capacity for foreign pohcy 

 initiatives in science and technology: 



The transfer of responsibilities from the former Presidential Science Adviser 

 and the Office of Science and Technology has generated certain instabilities of 

 leadership in the area of science and technology. Under the previous arrangement, 

 many initiatives were taken Vjy the White House science and technology mech- 

 anism. Its direct relationship to the President, the NSC and 0MB reinforced 

 its leadership role in the substantive aspects of science, technology, and foreign 

 affairs, a role that was accepted by State and respected by the departments and 

 agencies. With the shift of responsibilities to the Director of NSF, minus the 

 national security function, the psychology, if not the symbol, of leadership 

 changed. Since the NSF has been heavily involved in international science co- 

 operation, the Science Adviser and Director of NSF roles are somewhat blurred. 

 In this situation, it appears necessary to have a clear understanding of respective 

 roles and prerogatives, with strengthening of the S&T capabilities of the Depart- 

 ment of State to frame S&T follow-up in response to Presidential and Secretary of 

 State initiatives, to take the lead in coordinating agency response, and to deal 

 directly with the NSC staff mechanism on matters that have in the past had a 

 strong scientific and technical input from the OST.^^^ 



During the early months of 1975 moves underway in both Houses 

 of Congress were aiming to restore in one way or another the science 

 ]:)ohc3^ framework in the Executive Office. Action in this area would be 

 likely to have consequences not only for domestic science policy- 

 making but for the diplomatic aspects as well. 



However, pending action on the Presidential science policy S3^stem, 

 the current situation is that aspects of international science and 

 technology poUcy, in the upper reaches of policymaking are spread 

 among: 



— The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 

 Scientific Affairs; 



— The State Department Policy Planning Staff; 

 ■ — ^The immediate staff of the Secretary of State; 

 — The National Security Council, and the Under Secretaries 

 Committee ; 



— The Director of NSF and the Science and Technology 

 Planning Office; and 



— Council on International Economic Policy. ^^'^ 

 Precisely how policy initiatives and responses can evolve out of this 

 rather complex congeries of high level institutions is not clear. It is 

 possible that a sharper definition of the tasks to be performed and a 

 formal definition of functions might help to sort things out a bit. The 

 complications may actually be more apparent than real, in view of 

 the extensive resort of Dr. Kissinger to personal diplomacy and also 



2'8 Brooks to Huddle, Febraary 10, 1975. 



2" Beckler to Huddle, March 5, 1975. 



2S0 The Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) was created by Presidential memorandum in 

 January 1971. The Congress first authorized the CIEP in the International Economic Policy Act of 1972 

 <88 Stat. 616), and granted further authorization by the act of,October 4, 1973 (87 Stat. 447). 



