1420 



scarcely noticed, (p. 450) (It was incorporated at that time as a planning and 

 coordinating staff in the Office of the Secretary') 



******* 



The impact of long-range planning staff, in the short run, must come from ques- 

 tions about the ideas and assumptions that guide the policymaker; and in the long 

 run, from its ability to discuss probable boundaries of the emerging international 

 sj'Stem, as well as the possible consequences of short-run actions, (p. 462) 



The conclusion of this analysis is not sanguine about the future of 

 foreign policy planning. It is unlikel}^ to succeed because those in 

 power do not believe in it. Thus: 



We must be pessimistic about the possibility of change. . . . The creation 

 of a long-range planning staff committed to taking the future seriously could be 

 an important innovation. It would add new and different voices to a political 

 process that has lost direction, self-confidence, and, most critically, its sense of 

 legitimacy. Nevertheless, even if this planning staff was created, it would be 

 naive to assume that it, or any other institution, which is merely added to the 

 old political system, could have a fundamental impact on how we conduct our 

 political affairs. Institutional reform is not bj' itself sufficient to Create basic 

 change unless it is accompanied by changes in professional belief S3stems. New 

 institutions must be staffed by men who understand and believe in their purposes. 

 For that to happen, we must change the minds of practitioners who believe that 

 planning is a waste of time and of theorists who believe that involvement in 

 practical affairs is sinful.'^* 



A more optimistic view is that human performance and human 

 relations are always more important than organizational boxes and 

 flow charts. Planning is likely to continue, whether or not there is a 

 congestion of other duties, or explicitly assigned functions. The prob- 

 lem is to assure that broad-gauge thinking and its product are reason- 

 ably concentrated and that decision makers give them access. It is also 

 important that the policy planners have time to think, that they 

 are in good communication with specialists whose expertise is per- 

 tinent, and that they do not ignore the intellectual explorations of 

 the academic community. 



Present Organization and Functions of the Policy Planning Staf 



The frequently voiced criticism that the Department of State was 

 excluded from the main stream of foreign policy and national .security 

 policy during the early 1960s w^as answered — at least on paper — by 

 the President's action, wSeptember 22, 1973, appointing Dr. Henry 

 Kissinger Secretary of the Department while retaining the title 

 of Assistant to the President for National Security' Affairs. Assignment 

 as Secretary gave him the resources of a large field staff, regional and 

 functional bureaus, and the Policy' Planning Staff; he could take the 

 experience and special knowledge of a large team of Assistant Secre- 

 taries, the most recentl}^ created being the head of the Bureau of 

 Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. As 

 Presidential assistant he had direct contact with the Chief Executive 

 and other members of his advisory staff in the White House as well as 

 lateral assistance from the several White House Councils, and was 

 himself the Director of the National Security Council staff numbering 

 about 70. (See Table 5.) As either Secretars' or Assistant to the Presi- 

 dent, he had access to the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency 

 and other elements of the intelligence community. 



13" Robert L. Rothsteiii, "Planning in Foreign Affairs," Policy Sciences 4 (1973), p. 464. 



