1346 



Among tlie problems and issues in the design of an overseas science 

 and technology mission were : 



— Defining the functions of the mission; 



— Regional versus country contacts; 



— Maintenance of office continuity; 



— Preserving contacts with the home office ; 



— Maintenance of up-to-dateness of resident scientists; 



— Assurance of prestige and a voice within the Embassy; 



— Matching size of delegation to level of activity in the country; 



— Assuring uses of information obtained; and 



— Use of Foreign Service personnel versus appointment of 

 scientists. 

 There was no discussion of the distinction between "scientific" and 

 "technological" activities abroad, although this had been a feature 

 of the reports of Evans and his successor. However, the text of the 

 Berkner Report made clear that the subject being addressed was 

 "science" with technolog}^ as an incidental adjunct. 



The report concluded that overseas missions should include science 

 stafTs administered by the Department and backstaffed in Washing- 

 ton. Needs of other agencies should be met b^^ the Department, 

 although funded by the using agencies. The personnel should be part 

 of the Foreign Service, with the rank of attache and should be highly 

 qualified scientists. Appointments should be for 2 years, broken 

 by at least one Adsit home for consultation. These officers should 

 have nine functions: (1) reporting science trends, (2) assistance in 

 the exchange and evaluation of scientific and technological information, 

 (3) assistance in the exchange of scientific personnel, (4) mutual 

 assistance in procurement of scientific materials, (5) aid to U.S. 

 scientific groups abroad, (6) representation of U.S. science at foreign 

 meetings, (7) scientific adA^ice and coordination with the Em- 

 bassy staff, (8) arrangements for international collaboration on 

 scientific projects, and (9) "general promotion of better understanding 

 and closer relations between United States and foreign science." 

 Two kinds of science missions were envisioned : (a) larger staffs 

 serving as "centers for investigations" on a regional basis (e.g., 

 London-Western Europe; Johannesburg-South Africa; Rio de Janeiro- 

 South America; Sydney- or Canberra-Australia); (b) single country 

 staffs (two or three scientists) constituting representation to the one 

 country (nine were suggested). 



The report also took note of the fact that there were already two 

 U.S. science offices in London, one operated by the Department 

 of State and the other b}'^ the Office of Naval Research. It proposed 

 their merger into one State Department office.^" 



EFFECTS OF THE BERKNER REPORT 



The detailed description of the Berkner Report has been presented 

 here because for more than a decade it prescribed the organizational 

 framework and philosophic concept of science and technology in the 



3» However, this recommendation was not adopted. The ONR London office still exists. Its functions 

 are essentially to serve as a scientific window on Western Europe and to coordinate NATO research in naval 

 matters. It is staffed by 8-10 civilian scientists serving, usually, for two years, and a like number of uaval 

 officers. The civilian role is scientific information exchange, technical overview, aad special topical reports. 

 Emphasis is on highly qualified scientists able to contribute to technical exchanges, to avoid the appearance 

 of "intelligence" gathering. (Source: conversation with Dr. Russell C. Drew, formerly director of the ONR 

 office and cturently director of the Science and Technology Policy Office.) 



