628 



A chievement of Overwhelming Nuclear Force 



Probably the most salient and far-reaching tecluiological achieve- 

 ment of the present century is the atomic bomb. Traditionally, mili- 

 tary power supplied the principal support of the diplomat at the 

 bargaming table. But the undeniable force of nuclear weapons has 

 been of uncertain \'^lue in this role. These weapons are so destructive 

 that even the threat of their use has doubtful credibility. Accordingly, 

 the capability of a nation to produce a bomb, while it accords the 

 achieving nation technological distinction as a member of the "Nuclear 

 Club", does not automatically confer significant advantages of negotia- 

 tion in diplomacy. Nor does diplomatic advantage flow from the fur- 

 ther capability of delivering a large number of atomic bombs ac- 

 curately on remote targets by intercontinental guided ballistic missiles. 

 The ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to wreak de- 

 struction on any nation has not, for example, enabled resolution of 

 conflicts in Vietnam or the Middle East, persuaded a settlement of 

 the Kashmir issue, quieted dissonance in Cuba, or made a viable in- 

 strument of peacekeeping out of the United Nations. 



Many aspects of atomic technology present intractable problems 

 of contemporary diploipacy. The enormously destructive force of a 

 hydrogen bomb explosion has made general war unthinkable as a 

 rational course. Possession of a monopoly of nuclear weaponry from 

 August 1945 to October 1949 seemingly gave little advantage to Amer- 

 ican diplomats and generated many problems. One can only surmise 

 what might have happened without them, but their conjectural bene- 

 fits were accompanied by unmistakable diplomatic costs. 



During the monopoly period, the first issue was the possibility of 

 international control and ownership of atomic technology ; a move by 

 the United States to bring this about was abortive. The next issue was 

 the desirability of sharing atomic teclinology with allies of the United 

 States; the outcome of this issue was not only unfruitful but even 

 disadvantageous : 



When President Truman's proposal of July 14, 1949, to continue joint under- 

 takings with the United Kingdom was rejected in a meeting of leading oflBcials 

 at the White House, the decision was "resented by the British Government as a 

 repudiation of the close relationship that had existed during the war. . . ." ^ 



Rejection of the French request for assistance in atomic weapons and energy 

 programs ". . . affected the entire range of our diplomatic relations with the 

 central nation of the Common Market and of NATO and the NATO military 

 forces." ^ 



According to a French military analyst — 



From 1945 to 1953 or 1954, a period characterized by the American atomic 

 monopoly, Soviet expansion in Europe was limited only by United States negotia- 

 tion and, later, by the North Atlantic treaty. Hitherto everything had occurred 

 as though Moscow deliberately ignored American military possibilities, while 

 Washington took no further account of the decisive nature of the means the 

 West then possessed to oblige the Communist menace to withdraw. Each side 

 had been the dupe of the atom : the Soviets, in their ignorance, not fearing it ; 

 and the Americans not realizing the advantage their monopoly might have given 

 them.** 



^ David E. Lilienthal. "Change, Hope, and The Bomb." (Princeton, New Jersey, Prince- 

 ton University Press, 1963), page 121. 



23 Ibid., pages 122-3. 



2* Pierre Gallols. "The Balance of Terror : Strategy for the Nuclear Age." (With a fore- 

 word by Raymond Aron, Translated from the French by Richard Howard.) (Boston, 

 Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), page 23. 



