714 



T)n one of these issues, it was the absence of a systematic interna- 

 tional warning system, among other things, which precipitated tlie 

 thalidomide tragedy j-^*^ and WHO has only recently initiated steps 

 toward a fully operational system for international dnig monitoring. 

 But the delay has been more of a technical problem than a political 

 one.*' 



In recent years pressure has increased within WHO to adopt health 

 regulations concerning phannaceutical products. Under Article 22 of 

 the Constitution, the Health Assembly has the authority to bring such 

 regulations into force (if it were to pass them) "for all members after 

 due notice has been given of their adaption by the Plealth Assembly 

 •except for such members as may notify the Director-General of rejec- 

 tion or reservations within the period stated in the notice." ^* 



Also Article 21 points directly to "standards with respect to the 

 safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar 

 l^roducts moving in international commerce; advertising and labeling 

 of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in inter- 

 national commerce." *^ As a general practice, however, in this area as 

 well as others, the Assembly has preferred to make recommendations 

 in order to obtain uniform practices rather than adopting conventions 

 or regulations under constitutional provisions.^" With few exceptions, 

 ever since the First Assembly the attitude of ^VHO has been to rely 

 on the discretion of Members as to the methods to be employed to attain 

 the objectives of Assembly resolutions.^^ In some instances the Assem- 

 bly has sought to achieve the objectives of WHO by simply declaring 

 itself against certain practices rather than regulating against those 

 practices. For example: The Assembly "* * * considers that any with- 

 holding of scientific or t«<?hnical information on essential therapeutic 

 and prophylactic drugs, in selling or otherwise supplying nations with 

 the means for their production, or withholding the free exchange of 

 medical scientists, is not compatible with the ideals of the World 

 Health Organization and is against the interests of humanity." ^^ 



Across a wide variety of international health topics the World 

 Health Organization has regarded it a prudent tactic to rely less on 

 regulations and more on the authority of international biomedical 

 consensus. Thus, the Sixth Assembly recommoided the discontinu- 

 ance of the medical use of diacetylmorphine (heroin) l)ecause of its 

 addiction-producing qualities and of the availability of other less 

 harmful drugs for the purposes for which heroin was being pre- 

 scribed.^^ The Ninth Assembly, recommended that the planning and 

 implementation of projects concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic 

 energy should be made in close contact with responsible health 

 authorities.^* 



'"' "Chapter 14 : Thalidomide : The complex problem of dniR oontrol in free market." In 

 T^S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Technical Information for 

 Congress." Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the. . . . 

 9tst Congress, first session. Prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative 

 Reference Service, Library of Congress. April 25. 19f)9." House Document No. 91-137. 

 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909). page 3S0. 



ST "The Work of WHO. 1969 Annual Report of the Director-General." (Geneva, World 

 Health Organization, Alarch 1970), page 52. 



88 WHO Constitution, Article 22. 



80 Ibid., Article 21. 



«« Howard B. Calderwood, "Functions of the Assembly" (unpublished draft), page 55. 



«i "Official Records of WHO" (13), pages 121-6. 



«3 Second World Health Assembly, Resolution No. 2. In "Handbook of Resolutions," 

 op. cit. 



03 Sixteenth World Health Assembly, Resolution No. 14. In Ibid. 



»* Ninth World Health Assembly, Resolution No. 54. In Ibid. 



