1434 



Writing in 1970, Robert Gilpin, professor of politics and interna- 

 tional affairs at the Princeton University Center of International 

 Studies, called attention to the "major transformation" that the world 

 economy had undergone. Of primary importance were the "effects 

 of tlie contemporary technological revolution upon economic and 

 commercial activities. ..." Most noteworthy in their economic ef- 

 fects were advances in air and sea transportation, electronic communi- 

 cations, the emergence of a global market, and — "most significant of 

 all, the unprecedented innovation of new products and cost-reducing 

 industrial processes, which has profoundly altered the relationship 

 between technology and economics." 



Three major interrelated economic consequences have flowed from these de- 

 velopments. The first, ... is the increased interdependence among national 

 economies and the consequent greater sensitivity of foreign trade to changes in 

 economic conditions. The second is the enhanced role of technological innovation 

 in economic growth and competition. The third is the rapid expansion abroad of 

 the corporations, primarily American, that are best equipped to take advantage 

 of the new conditions of the world economy. These developments have in turn 

 produced in all major industrial nations a concern that they will be left behind and 

 they must formulate appropriate strategies to adapt their economi&s to the im- 

 peratives of economic growth and competition.'** 



The author went on to describe three national strategies of tech- 

 nology for economic objectives, and then concluded: "... To a 

 degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological 

 considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and con- 

 flicts seek their expression and work themselves out." 



In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and 

 where social and economic demands play an inordinate role in political life, the 

 choice, success, or failure of a nation's technological strategy will influence in large 

 measure its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its 

 domestic problems.'^" 



The necessity for combining expertise in technology analj^sis with 

 skill in economic analysis appears to be especially strong in the field of 

 foreign relations. An increasingly popular view is that the "technology 

 tail is already wagging the polic}^ dog." More explicitly: 



In the coming decade the new technology and how it is used will affect the dis- 

 tribution of power among nations. 



In developing his anal3'^sis from this theme, Victor Basiuk identified 

 consequences of the foreseen "rapid, accelerating technological change" 

 as being large benefits and political power to leading innovators among 

 nations, and increased impacts and "social discontmuities." He called 

 for "a timely appreciation of the emerging problems and a conscious 

 effort to plan ahead and frame policies to deal with them." ^^^ 



An effort to approach quantitatively and explicitly the kind of 

 forecasting effort urged by Basiuk was demonstrated by the National 

 Science Board in its report for 1973. Among the economic-technological 

 findings of that report, in a section on "indicator highlights" for the 

 "international position of U.S. science and technology," the Board 

 found that: 



The proportion of the gross national product (GNP) spent for research and 

 development (R&D) between 1963-71 dechned in the United States, France, 



1" Robert Gilpin, "Technological Strategies and National Purposes," Science, July 31, 1970, p. 441. 



i«o Ibid., p. 448. 



i»i Victor Basiuk, " Perils of the New Technology," Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 51-53. 



