810 



Difficult though the development of a technology may be, it is q^uick, 

 cheap, and easy compared with the political problem of mounting a 

 concerted human effort. If political effort is mobilized to apply an im- 

 perfect technology, yielding disappointment and costly failure, the 

 })olitical effort may be fruitless and the failure may add greatly to the 

 difficulty of mounting a second political effort after the technology is 

 perfected. 



A third issue is reflected in differences between the Peterson Report 

 and the position of FAO as reflected in Boerma's recent statement. The 

 primary thrust of the Peterson Report is that necessary organization, 

 motivation, and administrative control can be best mobilized for the 

 development of the LDCs by skillful use of the management leverage 

 supplied by an international credit institution, viz., the World Batik. 

 "Without playing down the importance of money, credit, and markets, 

 Boerma in his address to the International Federation of Agricultural 

 Producers saj'S he believes that "there has been too much emphasis on 

 the economic at the expense of the social aspect,'' It is, he says, "a rnis- 

 take to plan for development solely in terms of economic growth, 

 whicli neither necessarily nor automatically covers such problems as 

 unemployment, malnutrition, and education, to mention the most 

 obvious." 



The T'nited States has an obvious interest in the conflicts that seem 

 to liave been provoked by agricultural progress in the LDCs. However, 

 in the jnnnagement study reported to the Secretary of State by his 

 Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, November 20, 1970, the 

 recommendation was made that agricultural officers (up to now, sup- 

 plied by the Department of Agriculture) be assigned to missions 

 abroad on tlie priority basis of (a) wliether the countries are actual 

 or j)otential customers of U.S. agricultural exports, or (b) whether 

 they are compet itors of the United States. The need to observe ongoing 

 agiicMltural cliange is accorded no priority.*'^ Contemporary agricul- 

 tural 1 it eraturc conta ins vai'ious references to the problems encountered 

 by U.S. agricultural emissaries abroad in their contacts with their 

 coimterparts: in particular. susi)icions as to U.S. motives need to be 

 oveiconie. The rcix)rt cited aboxc imi)lies motives that seem to feed 

 rather than to allay such suspicions. 



^4 n En nmcrat'ion of Non-Terhnical OhHtdcles 



A considerable literature has appeared iji evaluation of the conse- 

 f|uencos of the Green Revolution in the developing countries. After the 

 first wave of optimism, a note of apprehension has been sounded and 

 seems to be growing stronger. Fears are expressed on the one hand 

 that the expanded availability of food will be delayed too long, and 

 will frustrate the expectations of those experiencing the pain of short- 

 age, leading to the violence of organized protest; on the othei: hand, 

 there is concern that the vigorous exploitation of new agricultural tech-j 

 nology will lead to serious dislocations of food supply, monetary sys- 

 tems and — above all — people. 



0" "Diplomaey for the 70's : A Program of Management Reform for the Department of 

 Stiti'"' <Wasl!in>rton. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), page 475. Department of 

 State Publication 8551. 



