1309 



TABLE 39.— CHANGING IMPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 

 [Net Imports as percent of domestic use] 



Net' imports (percent) 

 - 1950 1960 1970 



Ferrous metals: 



Iron ore 5 25 30 



Chromium. 100 94 100 



Cobalt ".. 92 75 96 



Columbium 100 100 100 



Manganese 77 92 94 



Nickel 99 88 91 



Tungsten 80 40 Q) 



Vanadium (') 41 1 



Nonferrous metals: 



Aluminum (bauxite).. 71 77 86 



Beryllium 89 96 w 



Copper 35 9 8 



Lead _ 59 59 40 



Net' imports (percent) 

 1950 



1960 



1970 



Nonferrous metals— Continued 



Magnesium 10 



Mercury 92 36 38 



Platinum 91 95 98 



Tin 100 100 100 



Titanium 32 30 47 



Zinc.-.- 37 54 60 



Other basic materials: 



Petroleum... 8 17 22 



Natural gas 13 



Uranium 47 



Timber products* 11 11 8 



Natural rubber 100 100 100 



' Net imports include semirefined forms (e.g. ferromanganese). 



2 Stockpile transactions distort proportions. 



3 Withheld for disclosure reasons. 



* Net imports in 1972 are up 50 percent from 1970. 



Source: Interim report (April 1972) National Commission on Materials Policy and Minerals Yearbook, Bureau of Mines 

 (Reproduced from : National Commission on Materials Policy, "Materials Needs and the Environment Today and Tomorrow 

 Final Report," 1973 p. 2.23.) 



Dependence on this scale for foreign supplies of minerals illustrates 

 U.S. vulnerability to pressures from the source countries. This vul- 

 nerability is increased by the fact that 15 of the 26 companies from 

 the advanced industrial countries involved in the foreign extraction 

 and production of oil, copper, aluminum, and nickel have their head- 

 quarters in the United States.^^^ Nationalization, or threat of 

 nationalization, is always the ultimate recourse in a changing 

 bargaining relationship, and for the United States the cost could 

 be considerable. U.S. corporations have invested some $30 billion in 

 LDCs and these investments are growing at about 10 percent a year.*^^ 

 "Confiscation of its investments in the Third World," Mr. Bergsten 

 states, "could thus create major costs for the United States." Much of 

 this investment, he went on, is in raw materials; so "Third World 

 action could affect the United States doubly (as it already has in oil) 

 by both raising our costs and reducing our earnings." ^^^ Thus de- 

 pedency inevitably creates vulnerability. 



Pote7itialities for ConfAct. — The potentialities for conflict between 

 the United States and the LDCs seem to issue from three sources : 



(1) The inherent U.S. dependency on foreign supply. ("For 

 the United States," the Minerals Policy report said, "self-suffi- 

 ciency is technically possible at times, but economically unfeasible 

 and diplomatically unacceptable at others.") 



(2) The fact that the United States has the highest per capita 

 demand for materials, while the rate of demand is increasing more 

 rapidly in the rest of the world so that mineral specialists now 

 speak of a "global minerals shortage" ; and 



(3) The growing awareness among the LDCs that they possess 

 unique marketable resources will tend to lessen their fears of ex- 

 ploitation and encourage a practical bargaining attitude.^" 



«i National Commission on Materials Policy, Final Report 1973, pp. 9-11. 

 ^^ Secretary of State Roger's Foreign Policy Report t€ Congress of 1972, 1973, p. 43. 

 *" Bergsten, op. cit., p. 112. 



SI* National Commis.sion on Materials Policy, Final Report, 1973, p. 4B-13, and The 

 Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1974, p. Al. 



