676 



interrelated economic consequences of modern technology. The first 

 is the "increased interdependence among national economies and the 

 consequent greater sensitivity of foreign trade to changes in economic 

 conditions." The second is the "enhanced role of technological inno- 

 vation in economic growth and competition." The third is the rapid 

 spread of multinational corporations, primarily dominated by Amer- 

 ican capital. He suggests that a "new international economy" is devel- 

 oping, under the stimulus of technology. 



There are, Gilpin's argument continues, three alternative national 

 strategies in response to this development: (1) "to support scientific 

 and technological development across the broadest front possible;" 

 (2) scientific and technological specialization; and (3) the importa- 

 tion of foreign technology. The United States and the Soviet Union 

 have followed the first strategy ; Sweden, Great Britain, and a number 

 of other countries have followed the second ; while Japan and West 

 Germany have in general followed the third. Although the U.S. strat- 

 egy has been relatively successful, particularly in fields of high tech- 

 nolo^ like space and the computer, it has begun to show defects, and, 

 in Gilpin's opinion, "the direction of America's technological strategy 

 will become an increasingly important political issue." 



In the first place, even America does not have the economic and technical re- 

 sources to support all projects of importance ; it too must choose. Second, a high 

 proportion of the limited resources has gone into military and military-related 

 projects, while pressing social and economic needs of the society have been 

 neglected. Third, the devastating consequence of technological advance for the 

 environment has suddenly emerged as a major national concern. . . . 



Accordingly, thought might be given ". . . to the formulation of a 

 more explicit technological strategy designed to increase the social 

 return of its immense investment in science and teclmology and to 

 minimize its negative environmental effects." Gilpin concludes with a 

 prediction that : 



... To a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological 

 considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and conflicts seek 

 their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry 

 has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands 

 play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a na- 

 tion's technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the 

 international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems.^" 



In Riesman's book, "The Lonely Crowd," he develops a theory of a 

 society divided into persons characterized as "Inner-Directed" and 

 "Other-Directed." If nations were so categorized, in aspects of their 

 behavior, it might be said that in the field of technology the United 

 States to a considerable degree is "Other-Directed." The great efforts 

 of the United States in science and technology — since 1940, at least — 

 were inspired by external events. The Manhattan Project was initiated 

 from fear that Nazi Germany might achieve nuclear power first. Work 

 on the H-bomb was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary 

 to beat the Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic misstte submarine was a 

 response to the Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the 

 space race was an effort to catch and pass the Soviets in an area in 

 which they had assumed a lead. The great technological programs 



1*1 Robert Gilpin. "Technological Strategies and National Purpose." Science, (July 31, 

 1970, volume 169), pp. 441-2. 



