1357 



that State's inability to recruit a bona fide scientist for the post lay- 

 in failing to define properly the role of the ofl&ce." In his view : 



The most important function of the science adviser can be summed up simply, 

 if academically, as ensuring that the relevant scientific and technological a-^pects 

 of central issues of foreign policy are integrated in policy deliberations. For an 

 astonishing range of policy concerns these aspects are of critical importance to 

 the choices facing the policy makers. And for those foreign policj^ issues of the 

 greatest interest, these technical aspects are not simply background facts to be 

 provided by an "expert." Instead, representing them effectively in the policy 

 process requires good scientific judgment, involves estimates of future develop- 

 ments in both science and technology, and, most important, demands a thorough 

 appreciation of the ways in which the technological alternatives may depend on 

 and interact with the political alternatives. ISIoreover, science and technology are 

 also available to the policy maker as new instruments of poUcy — instruments 

 that can be used appropriately only when there is adequate understanding of 

 their special characteristics and of the relationshij) between those characteristics 

 and policy objectives. ' 



He warned that: 



The Secretary of State's role as chief foreign policy adviser to the President 

 will, in fact, be' increasingly in jeopardy if the Department under him. continues 

 to be deficient in effective technical-political competence while the issues v.ith 

 which it must deal involve ever more sophisticated scientific and technological 

 elements. 



The Department's policy role in arms control, weaponry transactions, 

 space, and atomic energy required at least a degree of technical skill 

 to ask the right questions of mission agencies to provide a diplomatic 

 input to Presidential decisions. 



Even in domestic scientific matters, there was a role for the De- 

 partment. In particular, there was the need — 



... to estimate the future, to examine the ways in which international relations 

 and perhaps the international political system will be altered as science and tech- 

 nology continue their explosive advance, and to explore the likely changes in 

 what constitutes the "national interest." ** 



By tliis time the question began to be asked as to whether it was 

 realistic to expect to find and recruit a willing, outstanding scientist 

 with diplomatic and administrative skills. It was still "desirable." 

 But as SkolnikofT put it : 



Lastlj% need the science adviser be a scientist? If one looks only to the nature 

 of the required "technical" inputs into policy, the answer is preferably, but not 

 necessarily, for those inputs require as much understanding of the political side 

 of an issue as of the technical. With good technical associates, and experience in 

 dealing with technical questions, a nonscientist could provide the bridge. How- 

 ever, he vv-ould have to surround himself with individuals with good technical 

 judgment, and this would not be easy.^B 



And in point of fact, "scientific stature will not make any dift"erence 

 whatever unless the science adviser has the basic ability to relate 

 science and technology to foreign policy matters and the force and 

 energy to make his views knovv-n and felt within the Department." 



M Eufrene B. Skolnikoff, "Scientific Advice in the State Department," Science, November 25, 1966, p. 980. 

 M Ibid., p. 983. 

 M Ibid., p. 984. 



