887 



programs.^" Salomon reports that grants and other funding are 

 sometimes based on poHtical motives; similarly, achievement in 

 science is used as a legitimate currency in cultural diplomacy: 



In international scientific relations, private and governmental aspects are 

 interdependent and are often indistinguishable. Grants and subsidies made by 

 governments to scientists to facilitate international exchanges are not without 

 ulterior motives, and iu what has been called "scientific tourism" political or 

 military espionage cannot always be ruled out. In the conquest of Asia, the mis- 

 sionaries supported the settlers and, more recently, the archaeologists, the diplo- 

 mats in carving up of the Middle East; in the same way, scientists are called upon 

 to fulfill, officially or not, pubUc functions which are connected with their tech- 

 nical or private preoccupations. There is also the role which they are called upon 

 to play in the great international fairs where the conquests of science are entered 

 into the account books as national achievements. In the framework of this 

 "cultural diplomacy", which has been defined as the "manipulation of cultural 

 materials and personnel for propaganda purposes", men of science are exhibited 

 like film stars or boxing champions.^' 



In addition, Salomon seems to imply that scientists participating in 

 ostensibly non-political international scientific activities are frequently 

 given political missions: 



The Pugwash Conferences, which bring together privately scientists of "good 

 will" do not escape the constraints of technonature — the good will or the com- 

 pliance of governments towards them is in no way absent from the calculation. 

 In fact, a reading of the lists of participants in the Pugwash Conferences is enough 

 to pick out the names of the scientists or political observers who are officiallj^ or 

 unofficially linked with political decision -making bodies, whether in the East or 

 West.22 



These considerations undoubtedly present both scientists and policy- 

 makers with a dilemma. Thus, according to Dr. T. O. Jones, director 

 of National and International Programs, NSF, international scientific 

 programs based on purely political motives frequently fail: 



. It has been my experience in dealing with international science activities over 

 the years, that whenever one contrives a scientific program purely for the purpose 

 of political advantage or motivation it frequently fails, because the science is 

 contrived and not genuine, and is not really of interest to the scientific 

 community. 23 



A variety of personal motives have been attributed to U.S. scientists 

 who go abroad in Government-funded exchange programs. For in- 

 stance, Donald J. Shank, as executive vice-president of the Institute 

 of International Education, which administers educational exchange 

 programs below the senior professional level for the Department of 

 State, reports that personal motives, travel, and cultural interests, 

 and the desire to learn a foreign language, motivate many exchange 

 scholars : 



. . . Although many sponsors say they promote educational exchange in order 

 to build international understanding and peace, they are usually forced to include 



20 Objective measurements might be used, for instance, to determine whether one program is more polit- 

 ically or diplomatically oriented than another. For example, a researcher could hypothesize that if an 

 exchange program required its participants to meet certain characteristics it might be more politically 

 oriented than one that did not, such as by being required to possess language capability, to undergo pre- 

 departure and post-trip debriefing by the USIA and the CIA, or to report in detail on the foreign policy 

 aspects of their overseas activities. These questions were asked of administrators in charge of the specific 

 programs surveyed in this study; the responses indicate that while these factors may tend to indicate that 

 some programs directly serve political interests more than others, additional information is required to 

 demonstrate a valid relationship. Other information, such as interviews with scientists, a task beyond the 

 scope of this paper, would have to be utilized. However, according to Ambassador Taft, Department of 

 State, intelUgence debriefing frequently is mandatory in some programs. (Interview, August, 1971.) 



« Salomon, "The Internationale of Science," op. cit., p. 32, citing F. C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural 

 Oflen»jve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5960), p. 10. 



« Ibid., p. 39. 



» U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, 

 and Development, 1971 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, 

 p. 252. 



