989 



agreements, are administered by the National Academy of Sciences; 

 furthermore, a large portion of the diplomatic maneuvering behind 

 the initiation of agreements, revisions, renewals, and daily operations 

 are handled by the NAS and its counterparts, the Soviet Academy 

 of Sciences, and the Academies of Sciences of the Eastern European 

 countries. 



Two reasons explain this difference in administration of the bilaterals 

 with the Communist bloc. The first is political; the second reflects 

 the locus of the conduct of scientific research in the Soviet Union 

 and Eastern Europe. 



UnUke their American colleagues who, in visiting non-Communist 

 countries, are free to make their own personal arrangements with their 

 scientific counterparts for research, study, and travel, Americans 

 visiting the Soviet Union and other Communist countries of Eastern 

 Europe are constrained by regulations of the Departments of State 

 and Defense in the United States and by those of the Foreign Min- 

 istr}^ of the host countries. The activities of scientists from Com- 

 munist countries are similarly restricted. Typically, Soviet and Amer- 

 ican scientists in the host country are excluded from certain industrial 

 sites and research laboratories in "sensitive" geographic locations; 

 their length of stay and activities are limited by provisions in visas 

 issued by the State Department or the Foreign Ministry. In the case 

 of the Soviet Union as host, visitors from the United States are re- 

 quired to stick, more or less, to planned itineraries with appropriate 

 guide and interpreter accompaniment. 



These restrictions impose serious strains on the conduct, integrity, 

 and independence of free scientific interchange. The origin of the 

 Soviet-Eastern European programs illustrates the hypothesis that 

 these strains would be mitigated if major and early precedent- breaking 

 responsibility for program development and administration were 

 given to scientists, and, insofar as possible, nongovernmental scien- 

 tists, rather than exclusively to foreign policy administrators. Among 

 the specific advantages of this arrangement are the following. Staff 

 members of the NAS, unlike staff of the Department of State's Edu- 

 cational and Cultural Exchange Bureau, are intimately familiar with 

 requirements for the conduct of research and with the problems of 

 designing potentially fruitful research proiects within the limits im- 

 posed by political restrictions on scientific activity. Furthermore, 

 since this staff is prestigious and nongovernmental, both sides to the 

 agreement undoubtedly have greater confidence that the programs 

 and the scientists exchanged under them would be as beneficial as 

 possible to the advancement of science, the mutual detennination of 

 priorities for exchange, and the cultivation of personal relationships 

 so necessary for developing continuous cooperation. 



The NSF, as principal U.S. funding agency for scientific research 

 and development, has a lonp- tradition of noninvolvemcnt with political 

 activities on the grounds that such involvement might obstruct the 

 conduct of free, unfettered scientific exchange between nations. 

 However, the alternative of direct NSF administration of the bilaterals 

 has been precluded by considerations governing the locus of conduct 

 of scientific research and development in the Warsaw Pact countries. 

 Due to the centralized nature of Communist organization and fund- 



