1327 



This view, expressed by a man long active in the space program and 

 in private industry, is echoed in the academic community: 



Since the end of World War II, the world economy has undergone a major 

 transformation. . . . The effects of the contemporary technological revolution 

 upon economic and commercial activities have been of primary importance. 

 [And later on, in the same article.] To b, degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, 

 economic and technological considerations will shape the ways in which political 

 interests and confUcts seek their expression and work themselves out. In a world 

 where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and where social 

 and economic demands play an inordinate role in the political life, the choice, 

 success, or failure of a nation's technological strategy will influence in large measure 

 its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic 

 problems.' 



Statement of the Problem of Technical Diplomacy 



The main hj^pothesis of the present study is- that science and 

 technology are in fact important and perhaps separable ingredients of 

 diplomacy, and that they warrant explicit organizational provision in 

 the Department of State and in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. The 

 problem, then, is to characterize the elements of U.S. foreign policy 

 and the elements of both science and technology that interact most 

 strongly with it, and to examine legislative or organizational options 

 to strengthen the performance of the Department of State in the 

 design and conduct of U.S. diplomacy. This main proposition suggests 

 a number of apparent requirements. For example : 



— The need to organize the Department of State most effectively 

 to exploit selectively the unique strength of the United States in 

 both its science and its technolog}^; 



— The need for the Department of State to anticipate the need 

 for, and to initiate, action — especially future-oriented action — in 

 these fields, rather than responding to foreign pressures; 



— The need to understand the processes by which technological 

 innovations, and their wide use, produce changes in the dip- 

 lomatic environment ; 



— The need to increase the technical sophistication of the practi- 

 tioners of diplomacy at all levels and in most — if not all — 

 organizational units ; 



— The need to translate the generalized and normative goals of 

 American foreign policy into operational goals to which American 

 technological superiority can effectively contribute ; 



— The need to establish a closer functional relationship between 

 the specific and concrete goals of foreign policy and domestic 

 programs of science and technology and to enlist the communities 

 of science and technology in support of these foreign pohcy goals; 

 and lastly, 



— The need for a close relationship in diplomatic policy planning 

 involving the White House, the Executive Office of the President, 

 the Department of State, and Government agencies having 

 international technical missions. 

 The role of the Department of State in the formulation and imple- 

 mentation of foreign poUcy is a central variable: strong Presidents 

 take up diplomacy as a personal task, while leaving the chores and 

 less interesting initiatives to the Department; conversely, some strong 



' Robert Gilpin, "Technological Strategies and National Purpose," Science, July 31, 1970, pp. 441. 448. 

 The author is professor of politics and international affairs, and faculty associate, Center of International 

 Studies, Princeton University. 



