1350 



Slimmer of 1957 that the growing importance of scientific develop- 

 ments as an element in formulating foreign policy and carrying on 

 relations with other governments called for a new emphasis in this 

 field." " 



THE IMPACT OF SPUTNIK 



However, the trauma of Sputnik, in October of that y^r, galvanized 

 the Department into action. According to Skolnikoiff: 



Sputnik . . . was the turning point. With the reaction to the Russian achieve- 

 ment came the realization that, had there been adequate coupling of science and 

 technology with foreign policy formulation, the United States might have been 

 able to avoid a humiliating and dangerous incident in its history .^^ 



Accordingly, in January 1958 at the suggestion of Dr. James R. 

 Killian, Jr. — who had been named Special Assistant to the President 

 for Science and Technology — Secretary Dulles reestablished his 

 science office, naming it ''Science Adviser to the Department of 

 State," and appointed to the post Dr. Wallace R. Erode, associate 

 director of the National Bureau of Standards. During World War II, 

 Erode had served as OSRD scientific liaison in London and later 

 Paris. He remained in the State Department position until September 

 1960. 



An enthusiastic article in the Foreign Service Journal ^' greeted 

 Dr. Brode's appointment. It noted that Dr. Erode was president of the 

 American Association for the Advancement of Science and a member 

 of the National Academy of Sciences. It noted the expressions of 

 professional and editorial approval of his selection. And it described 

 the role he and his associates would play in the Department: 



Assist other Federal agencies and private groups . . . encourage our own 

 scientists during their initial participation in such new groups as the International 

 Rocket Society and a new society of bio-chemists . . . work on the Law of the 

 Seas . . . cooperation with Mexico and Canada in scientific research in the field 

 of contamination ... air and water pollution . . . the International Geophysical 

 Year . . . meteorological progress . . . technical provisions in treaties and inter- 

 governmental agreements covering such items as ship and plane travel and naviga- 

 tional equipment . . . radio and radar communications and other advances in the 

 field of electronics work in close partnership with the military . . . space and 

 space control . . . (possibly) an international Science for Peace program. 



Like his predecessor, Dr. Erode spent most of his time in oflBce re- 

 cruiting and organizing. The expansion came at a time when science 

 budgets everywhere were rising rapidly, and Brode's insistence on 

 "top-level scientists" made recruitment difficult in a time of scientific 

 manpower shortage.*" Upon his retirement in 1960 he was followed by 



•^ Science Adviser of the Department of State, p. 8. 



M Skoloikofl, op. oit., p. 257. However, the issue is by no means clearcut. The Soviet sputnik had been 

 put up by a military booster. The U.S. program to put a satellite into orbit was relying on a"Vanguard" 

 system managed by the Navy but with no military significance. The TOY program in the United States 

 was represented as pure science and accordingly totally visible, hence without the use of secret hardware. 

 It is not evident that the Department of State could have influenced a departure from this principle, or that 

 It could have been persuaded by a vigorous science ofHce to do so, or that such a science office would have 

 desired it, or that the science commimity that would have been its prime constitutency would have sup- 

 ported such an effort to persuade. However, it is more probable that a science office could have alerted the 

 Department to the need for countermeasures in anticipation of the Soviet success; the Soviet satellite pro- 

 gram was no -secret and its use of military hardware heightened the probability of its succeeding. Much 

 could have been done to lessen the shock of the Soviet success, and to prepare a more measured U.S. 

 response. 



" C. Edward Clark, "Science and Diplomacy," Foreign Service Journal 35 (April 1958), pp. 31-34. A 

 career Foreign Service officer and later an Ambassador, Clark was then executive assistant to the Assistant 

 Secretary of State for Administration. 



"According to Skolnikofl, op. cit., p. 258: 



The emphasis of the office during Dr. Brode's tenure and, i ndeed, during the tenure of his succes- 

 sors, was again on international scientific activities. Disarmament, space, and atomic energy were 

 handled by another office: the Secretary's Special Assistant, at that time Mr. Pliilip Farley. Other 

 policy areas such as military policy, foreign aid, international organization, or information activities 

 were all but ignored, or the technical inputs were provided by the White House science office. 



