1417 



which the Panel considers of central importance." All but item 6 were 

 directly technological in character, and the exception had numerous 

 technological implications. The 10 items were: 



1. The depletion of and the need to conserve critical natural resources — in- 

 cluding the question of future sources of energy. 



2. The developing competition for the resources of the oceans and the t3'pe of 

 international regulation of access and competition which will be required. 



3. The possibilities of weather modification and inadvertent climate modifica- 

 tion as these bear on the ecological system, including agricultural production 

 and human settlements 



4. The implications of world population growth — from 1.6 billion in 1900 to an 

 anticipated 6.5 billion by the year 2000. 



5. The widening economic gap between the developed and the less developed 

 countries — under the impact of a science and technology centered principally 

 in the industrial areas 



6. The unresolved trade, tariff, and balance of payments questions, and the 

 urgency of creating an improved international monetary system. 



7. The implications for the international community — both the developed and 

 the less developed countries — of the growth of multinational corporations, and 

 the need for the development of international guidelines. 



8. The impact of instant international communications and the international 

 implications of direct broadcasting from satellites into home receivers. 



9. The need for strategic and conventional arms agreements as a basis for 

 bringing escalating national defense budgets under some form of control and 

 reducing the dangers of nuclear and non-nuclear war. 



10. The urgent need to build into the proliferating international institutional 

 structure new measures for the settlement of disputes and conflicts which are 

 likely to arise over the type of issues outlined above — as a means of moving 

 toward a more stable international system.^^* 



It is hard to know how literalh* to read the various statements by a 

 succession of Secretaries of State and their subordmates when they 

 periodically assert the importance of science and technology for 

 diplomacy. The roster of problems, issues, and instances that can be 

 collected from such statements is impressive. But the effort to marshal 

 the Department's resources to deal with this array of business does 

 not seem commensurate with the demand. 



Proposals to strengthen the polic}' plamiing resources of the De- 

 partment are numerous. Some students propose to place the science 

 and technology- part of the pohcy planning function in the science 

 office. Skolnikoff, for one, urges this, although he also suggests at one 

 point that the function would be "possibly working in conjunction 

 M-ith the Policy Plamiing Council, wliich would be the logical first 

 I'ecipient for the information." ^^^ 



Writing in 1969, Edward J. Kolodziej saw the position of the 

 Secretary of State as weakened by the reactivation of the National 

 Security Council (NSC) by President Nixon. At the same time the 

 enlargement of the planning staff (or as it was then called, the "Plan- 

 ning and Coordination Staff") might buttress the Department but 

 complicate the Secretary's relations with the Under Secretary. As he 

 said : 



While the institutional position of the Secretary of State appears to be decreas- 

 ing, that of the Under secretary of State may be increasing. The recent reorgani- 

 zation of the State Department Policy Planning Council [in July 1969], renamed 

 the Planning and Coordination Staff, and its expansion from approximately 15 to 

 20 members suggests this possible development. The staff will be loosely divided 

 into two groups for planning and operations, roughly reflecting the distinction 



i3« United Nations Association of the United States of America, National Policy Panel, Foreign Policy 

 Decision Making: The New Dimensions (New York: U.N. Association of the U.S.A., May 1973), pp. lo-lb. 

 i» Skolnikoff, op. cit., pp. 273-281, and especially p. 275. 



