1439 



relationship between OES, as the departmental center for science and 

 technolog3% and the regional and functional bureaus. The question 

 is whether there are functions of these latter bureaus that warrant in- 

 bureau staffing to give express attention to the scientific and tech- 

 nological content of developments abroad. 



In the particular case of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

 (INR) a useful purpose might be served by reconsidering a decision 

 made over the past several years to minimize the organizational 

 emphasis on functional elements and to concentrate more emphasis on 

 regional or geographic elements. The role of OES is centered on policy 

 formulation; that of INR could be on data review and analysis; that 

 of 10 and CU could address multilateral coordination with the sup- 

 port of other mission agencies; and that of the regional bureaus could 

 include coordination of bilateral and other regional science and tech- 

 nology ai-rangements — supported by OES and appropriate mission 

 agencies. Science and technolog}' have so profound an impact on 

 present diplomacy, and prospectively on future diplomatic problems 

 and opportunities, that what is needed is not only a central point for 

 science and technology in the Department of State but also a general 

 and widespread competence to deal with scientific and technological 

 issues and impacts. The diplomat, as several Secretaries of State have 

 pointed out, must today be technically ''literate." The technically- 

 oriented people in OES need to be in close contact with technically- 

 oriented people in the other functional and policymaking elements of 

 the Department. Herman Pollack has given considerable thought to 

 this issue and offers the following commentary : 



I believe that any officer dealing with foreign policy — or for that matter with 

 any significant aspect of public policy generally — should be "technically literate". 

 At the very minimum, he must have enough grasp of the technical implications 

 of a subject to be aware of when he needs professional technical support. Prefer- 

 ably, he should have sufficienth'- strong technical comprehension to be able to 

 follow and understand a professional discussion of the technical aspects of a 

 problem. Just as a Secretary of State cannot perform eflfectively without under- 

 standing international economics, so today he cannot be fuUj'^ effective if he is tech- 

 nically innocent. This is perhaps most obvious in nuclear and space matters 

 because of their security significance, but it is just as pertinent in energy, food, 

 industrial policy and other areas. 



A concentration of expertise in a functional office is not alone a sufficient answer. 

 That must be blended, with widespread sophistication in science and technology 

 among the policy officers of the Department of State. That sophistication does 

 not exist today. I hold the institutions of higher learning principally responsible. 

 Their programs of instruction do not reflect the scientific revolution that we all 

 assert is taking place in our presence. The computer, electronic, nuclear and space 

 ages, to mention a few of the key ones, do not yet show up in the typical liberal 

 arts program. Therefore the new classes of Foreign Service officers arrive tech- 

 nically unsophisticated and the burden of training is transferred to the State 

 Department. 



The Department's response cannot by any standards be considered successful. 

 Foreign Service Institute courses, college assignments, exchange programs with 

 technical agencies. Secretary's Science Luncheons, Secretary's Science Lectures, 

 Foreign Service recruiting in technical faculties have all been tried, but never 

 on a scale or with the priority necessary to produce a marked impact. 



It may take another Sputnik to shock the JJ.S. into effective action. There has 

 to be developed, it seems to me, a national will to move forward to the scientific 

 and technological realities of the 1970s. This would lead to a fundamental change 

 in the educational curriculum and to high priorities within the State Department 

 to programs designed to equip its officers to deal with those realities. "^ 



"1 PoUack to Huddle, March 25, 1975. 



