1478 



influenced by the particular outlook of the country desk officer, over- 

 seas Ambassador, or regional Assistant Secretary," which in turn 

 ''frequently reflects the objectives and interests of the Foreign Service 

 more than those of the President." (p. 75) 



The Secretary's ''greatest single need" was for a "team of top 

 policy associates who are experienced in government and foreign 

 policy, loyal to the Secretary and the President, and able to work 

 as a team in advising the President and leading the bureaucracy." 

 For current operational matters therefore, 



To assure effective top-level coordination of current policy on specific issues, 

 the panel believes there should be a unified staff serving the Secretary, the Deputy 

 '■Secretary, and the Under Secretaries. The staff should be headed by a Director, 

 personally chosen by the Secretary, without reference to whether he has served 

 in the career ranks. The other staff members should represent a mix, with several 

 ■from non-career ranks. Care should be taken to avoid making the unified staff 

 so large that its members lose touch with Secretarial views and priorities, (p. 81) 



In addition, the panel recommended a separate planning staff for 

 long range studies and early warning of future problems: 



We would envisage a Planning Staff in the Department of State familiar with 

 the priority global issues, aware of the international interests and activities of 

 all principal Executive Branch departments and agencies, and equipped to 

 perform a continuous "scanning" role in identifying emerging issues well before 

 they reach crisis proportions. The unit should also be able to marshal any necessary 

 staff resources from principal technical agencies as they move to develop the 

 salient options for U.S. policJ^ It should report directly to the Secretary, (p. 80) 



Such a unit, said the report, p. 79, "could be of major assistance to 

 the Secretary and his senior assistants, to the President, and to the 

 Wliite House staff in planning the U.S. response to the new global 

 context." 



STRENGTHENING THE FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS 



Observed the Panel (p. 76) : "The priority consistently given to 

 regional over functional issues, and bilateral over multilateral relation- 

 ships, makes the State Department of the past and present C|uite 

 different from the one we need in the future." With respect to the 

 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) and the Bureau of 

 International Scientific and Technological Affairs (SCI) [now renamed, 

 and designated OES] ,as well as 10, the panel said: 



There is no question in our minds but that these bureaus need to be substantially 

 strengthened, as does the relationship between such bureaus and the top Depart- 

 mental leadership. In a world of transnational relationships, a State Department 

 that cannot speak crediblj^ on economic, social, scientific, or environmental 

 issues will be condemned to a peripheral role, whether its weakness stems from 

 limited staff competence at the bureau level or neglect of these issues at the top 

 level. The priority still given to bilateral, regional bureau issues by top Depart' 

 mental leadership, and the still-predominant weight of those bureaus on issues 

 dealt with below the Seventh Floor, characterize a Department still structured 

 more to cope with the vanishing world of bilateral inter-governmental relationships 

 channeled mainly through foreign offices than with the new transnational political, 

 economic, and scientific milieu, (p. 82) 



However, there were "four longstanding disadvantages in relying 

 on the functional bureaus in preference to the regional bureaus, and 

 these were "not easy to remedy": 



1. They do not have the "bargaining advantages" that grow 

 from principal control of communications to overseas capitals. 



