625 



industry. (2) Production of industrial goods in increasing volume 

 exceeded the domestic capacity to consume, and led to progressive 

 penetration of foreign markets. (3) Lagging sectors of the U.S. econ- 

 omy sought protective tariffs and agricultural producers relied in- 

 creasingly upon Government subsidies and assistance to maintain 

 "parity" with the industrial sector of the economy. 



These developments brought the United States into the tangled 

 maze of international monetary relations, currency exchange prob- 

 lems, tariff negotiations, and questions of trade regulation. The need 

 grew for commercial representation in foreign ports, for commercial 

 and technological intelligence about agricultural production and min- 

 eral discoveries abroad, and for information about export and import 

 regulations and trade practices. 



World War II marked a revolutionary phase in the growth of U.S. 

 diplomacy. Before the war, the style of the Nation's diplomats was 

 that of an "observant wary minor power, with no bargaining instil- 

 ments to bring to bear. . . ." But, "With the fall of France in 1940 

 and the British demonstration of military viability in the autumn, 

 the United States turned to the task of bringing its assets to bear in 

 relation to its interests on a worldwide basis ; and thus was launched 

 the third and truly revolutionary phase of the American diplomatic 

 tradition." ^® 



The primary basis for American diplomatic resources was the com- 

 bination of industrial productivity and military potency displayed in 

 that war. Characteristic of the war was the emphasis on science and 

 technology. 



The experience of the Second World War was distinctive in three respects. 

 First, military technology became linked to one area of science virtually at 

 the level of fundamental science — atomic physics. Second, military technology 

 became linked to several ai^eas of rapidly developing technology . . . notably 

 electronics, rockets, and jet turbines. In all of these areas major new engineer- 

 ing (rather than fundamental scientific) breakthroughs were in the process 

 of developing in the intervrar years; and military technology . . . accelerated 

 their unfolding practical possibilities. . . . 



The third characteristic . . . was simply that the scale on which first- 

 rate minds were mobilized exceeded anything in past experience ; and this 

 yielded a flow of technological developments derived from all levels of sci- 

 ence and technology and applied over the full range of military activity on 

 a unique scale. Like modern industry, modern warmaking came to build into 

 its institutional structure the process of purposeful invention and innovation; 

 and thus in quite new ways and on a quite new scale, a partnership was launched 

 between the professional military men and the men of science and engineering." 



Following the close of the war, the shapers of American foreign 

 policy found themselves confronted with an amazing array of un- 

 resolved problems and alternatives. Collapse of the German Reich 

 had left a power vacuum in war-torn Central Europe, and the United 

 States accepted the obligation to aid the belligerent Powers to repair 

 the destruction of their technological structures and infrastructures. 



An initial diplomatic effort to achieve multinational cooperation 

 through' the United Nations failed with the withdrawal of the So- 

 viet Union from the wartime alliance, the collapse of Nationalist 



" Ibid., pages 34-5. 

 " Ibid., pages 59-60. 



