629 



When the Soviet Union broke the atomic monopoly, late in 1949, the 

 response of the United States was to proceed with the development of 

 fusion weapons, weapons for limited nuclear warfare, and studies of 

 air defense.25 Diplomatically, the Soviet Union exploited its possession 

 of atomic weapons as an advantage : 



Each visible stage of the increase of Soviet power has provoked and justified 

 new pressures. After the first Russian atomic explosion of 1^9, it appeared pos- 

 sible to shift from the cold war in Europe to the warm war in Asia. After 

 Sputnik I and the Soviet ballistic missiles came the Berlin ultimatum, the cam- 

 paign of visits, the demonstrations of the inanity of the atomic armament . . . 

 and then the offer of a disarmament plan which would permit the numerically 

 superior side to impose its own laws.^ 



Nevertheless, the withdrawal by the U.S.S.R. of nuclear aid and tech- 

 nicians from China seems to have been a factor in precipitating what 

 has proved to be a persistent disaffection toward the U.S-S.R. 



The outcome of this tremendous technological effort by the two rival 

 forces is now that neither can exploit the force of the weapon, or even 

 threaten seriously to do so. 



THE PROBLEM OF STABILIZING DETERRENCE 



The mutual threat of nuclear attack seems to have had a stabilizing 

 effect on United States-U.S.S.R. relations since 1955, or thereabouts, 

 and the development of intercontinental and submarine-launched 

 missiles has apparently strengthened this effect. This technological 

 impasse was described in 1957 by Henry Kissinger. 



The essence of the nuclear stalemate is that it keeps the two superpowers from 

 launching an all-out war because each can force the other to pay an exorbitant 

 price for victory.^ [Accordingly] The destructiveness of modern weapons deprives 

 victory in an all-out war of its historical meaning. Even the side which inflicts 

 a greater devastation than its opponent may not retain suflScient resources to 

 impose its will.^ 



The existence of atomic weapons and delivery systems apparently 

 means that under conditions of general conflict, there can be no "total 

 victory" and that only limited conflicts for limited gains are feasible. 

 This kind of conflict, limited war, involvmg the renunciation of total 

 victory, is repugnant to our military thought with its emphasis on 

 breaking the enemy's will to resist and its reliance on the decisive role 

 of industrial potential." ^^ 



The various alternatives that have been advanced for the U.S. 

 posture include nuclear superiority, nuclear sufficiency, nuclear parity, 

 and perhaps a fourth category involving an assured and adequate 

 *'post-attack" striking capability — consisting of weapons of low vul- 

 nerability and high probability of penetration of an adversary's 

 territory. 



Maintenance of the deterrent posture can apparently take any of 

 these forms. There appears to have been a tendency for both the 

 United States and the Soviet Union to reject the fourth category. 



^ Rostow, "The United States in the World Arena : An Essay in Recent History," op. cit., 

 pages 248-9. 



=» Gallols, op. cit., page 231. 



^ Henry A. Kissinger. "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy." New York. (Published for 

 the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1957), page 125. 



» Ibid., p. -90. 



*» Ibid., pages 86-7. 



