631 



March 26, 1968: ". . . There seems little likelihood that either side 

 can break out of this situation of mutual deterrence and achieve a 

 marked strategic advantage." 



PARAMOUNTCY OF OFFENSE 



Throughout the history of atomic weaponry one consistent theme 

 has been the superiority of offense over defense. As a practical matter, 

 the stability of the mutual nuclear deterrent rests on the assured ability 

 of an attacked nuclear power to retaliate. Dr. Herbert York in testify- 

 ing for the Test Ban Treaty took the position that ". . . it is simply 

 easier to build devices that will penetrate a ballistic missile [i.e. assure 

 that the missile warhead reaches its target] than it is to build an anti- 

 missile which can cope with it." ^^ 



Similar confidence in the offense was expressed by Dr. Harold Brown, 

 as Secretary of the Air Force, He declared, May 14, 1968, that "The 

 Soviets could develop and deploy means to penetrate our defense at 

 substantially lower cost than we could build it." 



He did, however, hold out hope that eventually "lesser levels of 

 ABM defense, located around our missile fields, could serve to make an 

 attack on our retaliatory force more difficult," ^^ 



The vulnerability of the United States to ballistic missile attack was 

 also confirmed by Dr. John. Foster, the present Director of Defense 

 Research and Enginering : 



The likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the deployment of 

 significant U.S. defenses increases the technical uncertainty of the defensive 

 sysitem. Even vv'ith an ABM deployment we would have to expect that in an all- 

 out exchange, dozens of their warheads would likely exijlode in our cities.*^ 



Earlier, Secretary McNamara had stated that "none of the [ABM] 

 systems at the present or f oi-eseeable state of the art would provide an 

 impenetrable shield over the United States." ^* 



An analysis of future weapons and space systems by Harold A. 

 Linstone, Associate Director of Development Planning-Systems 

 Analysis, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., March 13, 1969, came to a similar 

 conclusion. He described ten technological options at the disposal of 

 the designers of offensive weapons, and concluded : "This diverse menu 

 of options to maintain a second strike capability in the face of tech- 

 nological changes also shows the difficulty of i)roviding an airtight 

 defense against the offensive arsenal of a teclniologically alert and 

 capable opponent, i.e., the Soviet Union." ^^ 



^•■^ Dr. York's qualifications included : his position at that time as Chancellor of the 

 University of California (San Diego), and his previous service as the first director of the 

 Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Liverniore, and as the first Director of Defense Research 

 and Engineering, during the Eisenhower administration. (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee 

 on Foreign Relations. "Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." Hearings before the . . . SSth Congress, 

 first session on Executive M. SSth Congress, 1st session, The treaty banning nuclear weapon 

 tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 

 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

 Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. August 12, 13, 14. 15. 19, 

 20, 21. 22, 23, 26, and 27, 1963. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Ofiice, 1963) 

 page 763.) 



^ Quoted in "U.S. Strategic Forces." In "Secretary Brown On U.S. Strategic Forces." 

 Extension of remarks of the Hon. Charles H. Wilson. Congressional Record, (May 20, 1968). 

 page E4377. Dr. Brown had succeeded Dr. York as Director of Defense Research and 

 Engineering. 



3" Quoted in "The Proposed ABM System." Discussion on the floor of the Senate. Con- 

 gressional Record, (June 13, 196S), page S7227. 



38 Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MoNamara. In Ibid., pages S7235-6. 



39 Harold A. Linstone. "Future Weapons and Space Systems — Comments on Technological 

 Forecasts for the Late 1970's and Beyond." In House "Strategy and Science : Toward a 

 National Security Policy for the 1970's." Hearings, op. cit., page 46. 



