632 



President Nixon, after an examination of the ABM issue, declared 

 March 14, 1969 : 



Although every instinct motivates me to provide the American people with 

 complete protection against a major nuclear attack, it is not now within our 

 power to do so. The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to 

 protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. 

 fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an op- 

 ponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet de- 

 terrent.^" 



A DISSEXTIKG VIEW OF DETERRENT STARILITY 



The durability of the deterrent and the effect of technology on arms 

 cx)ntrol negotiations (currently, tlie so-called SALT or ' Strategic 

 Arms Limitations Talks'") between the two super-powers were both 

 called into question by Dr. York in a recent article in Science. He 

 noted that there had been evidence, beginning around 1960. of a "major 

 Soviet effort in the ABM field" which had precipitated a ''technologi- 

 cal contest between missile defense and missiie offense . . .*" The prin- 

 cipal technological outcome of the contest was the "multiple warhead 

 idea-' or "MIRV". The Soviet Union had deployed about 70 ABM 

 interceptors, he said, and the response of the United States was to 

 deploy MIRVs, which would mean a net increase of around 5000 

 in the number of warheads aimed at Russia, The Soviet response to 

 this response was a multiple warhead development of their own, based 

 on large SS-9 missiles, said to contain three separate warheads of 

 five megatons each. The U.S. response to the SS-9 development was 

 to deploy the Safeguard ABM system to defend the Minuteman force. 

 He concluded: 



ABM and MIRV are thus inseparable; each one requires and inspires the 

 other. Separately or in combination, they create imcertainty in each of the nuclear 

 powers about the capability and even the intentions of the other. These uncer- 

 tainties eventually lead in turn to fear, overreaction. and further increases in 

 the number and types of all kinds of weapons, defensive as well as offensive. 



Moreover, Dr. York went on, the "ABM is a low-confidence system." 

 Its use would require a quick response or "launch-on-waming" doc- 

 trine. He declared : "The decision will have to be made on the basis 

 of electronic signals electronically analyzed, in accordance with a 

 plan worked out long before by apolitical analysts in an antiseptic 

 and unreal atmosphere. In effect, not even the President, let alone 

 the Congress, would really be a party to the ultimate decision to end 

 civilization." 



Even if the U.S. technology was equal to the task of designing fail- 

 safe electronic responses to control the ABlSf and the other elements 

 of tlie defense system. Dr. York questioned whether the Soviet Union 

 would be sufficiently competent. "Do they have the nece.ssary level of 

 sophistication to solve the contradiction inherent in the need for a 

 'hair trigger' (so that their system will respond in time) and a 'stiff 

 trigger' (so that they will not fire accidentally?) How good are their 

 computers at recognizing false alarms? How good is the command 

 and control system for the Polaris-type submarine fleet they are now 



""T^.S. President (Richard M. Nixon). "Ballistic Missile Defense System. Statement by 

 the President Announcing His Decision on Deployment of the System. March 14, 1969." 

 In Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Vol. 5, No. 11, March 17, 1969), 

 page 406. 



