633 



Tapidly^ if belatedly, building? Will it be 'fail-safe' r The point was 

 that "unfavorable answers to these (questions about tJieir capability 

 "will mean diminished national security for ws." ^^ 

 . A more hopeful view of the arms race was voiced by Herbert 

 ScoTille, Jr., of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in 

 September,*^ He suggested that "The resumption of new 'construct ion 

 on Soviet SS-9 missile sites * * * may well have been occasioned by 

 a Soviet decision under pressure from the military to emulate the 

 stated US policy of pressing forward with all programs until agree- 

 ments had been reached at SALT." Soviet awareness of the hazards 

 of the present situation was shown in a statement attributed to For- 

 eign Minister Gromyko (quoted in Dr. York's article in Science) to 

 tlie effect that : 



The command and control systems for arms are becoming increasingly autono^ 

 mous . . . from the people who create them. Human capacity to hear and see 

 are incapable of reacting to modern speeds. The human brain is no longer capable 

 of assessing at suflBeient speed the results of the multitude of instruments. 1 he 

 decisions made by man depend in the last analysis on the conclusions provided 

 by computers. Governments must do everything possible to be able to determine 

 the development of events and not to find themselves in the role of captive of 

 events. 



There appear to be at least six principal diplomatic effects of nu- 

 clear arms technology: (1) Unlimited general war is an impractical 

 and irrational enterprise and is not regarded as a realistic alternative 

 to diplomatic agreement as was pre-atomic warfare; (2) possession of 

 nuclear arms and delivery systems is essential to preservation of the 

 mutual deterrent posture of the two superpowers and pursuit of nu- 

 clear technology is essential in maintaining the balance of terror, a 

 form of stability; (3) deployment of new weapons is a competitive 

 activity in which both sides lose, which inhibits beneficial diplomatic 

 processes, and which obstructs efforts toward agreement in the control 

 of arms; (4) technological developments by either party are of in- 

 tense interest to the other; (.5) the dangers in this relationship are so 

 evident that formal means of direct communication have been judged 

 necessary to reduce the possibility of a triggering misunderstanding 

 of intentions; and (6) the condition of world peace, once only a pre- 

 ferable alternative, has become a paramount and imperative goal of 

 diplomacy. 



The Diplomatic Significance of Space Technology 



When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, the first manmade 

 Earth satellite, October 4, 1957, and followed this with a second suc- 

 cessful launch of Sputnik II, November 8, the Russian achievements 

 "caused a great deal of turmoil in the United States." It was a "real 

 jolt to the complacency of the American people." 



In true American tradition, a great clamor went up as to why the Soviet Union 

 was ahead of the United States, who was to blame for the situation, and what 

 was to be done about it.** 



« Herbert F. York. "ABM, MIRV. and the Arms Race." Science, (July 17, 1970, Volume 

 169), pages 2.57-60. 



*2 iJr. Scoville is currently with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Earlier 

 he was Assistant Director for Science and Technology, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

 Agency. His views were expressed in a paper delivered in September before a panel of 

 the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles. 



" U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Scientific and Technical Infor- 

 mation Division. Office of Technology Utilization. "Venture Into Space: Early Years of 

 Goddard Space Flight Center." Prepared by Alfred Rosenthal. (Washington, U.S. Govern- 

 ment Printing Office, 1968), pages 21, 23. (NASA Sp-4301). 



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