673 



The Pea|:^on Report takes a realistic view of the deficiencies of mul- 

 tinational agencies and programs. There were reasons, it noted, why 

 nearly 90 percent of official development assistance (in 1967) was bilat- 

 eral. Apart from historical colonial relationships, bilateral aid was 

 often more efficient. Personnel recruitment was less of a problem. Bi- 

 lateral programs could be more flexible and experimental in their pro- 

 cedures. They could encompass a wider scope of responses to real need. 

 There were also important political considerations : 



Most countries will usually feel that at least some multilateral agencies are 

 unduly dominated by the 'wrong' countries, whether aid-givers or recipients ; or 

 that they are following erroneous aid philosophies, either too hard or too soft, 

 too interventionist, or too lax ; or that they are simply badly run and that their 

 procedures are slow and expensive, (p. 209) 



Reasons in favor of multilateral aid were also set forth. It reduced 

 any overtones of charity or interv^entionism. It helped provide a frame- 

 work within which bilateral aid to whole nations could be better inte- 

 grated into a total program. It would reduce unequal geographical 

 preferences in aid distribution. It would stunulate regional integra- 

 tion among developing countries. It would pave the way for interna- 

 tional centers of documentation, advice, and guidance, (pp. 213-214) 



The Pearson Report emphasized the need for assistance programs 

 to be controlled and developed within and by the receiving nation. 

 Too often, such programs tended to be an extension of the thought 

 and culture of the donor country. Sometimes a program developed a 

 "life of its own, little related either in donor or recipient countries 

 to national or global development objectives." In particular, the Re- 

 port recommended that : 



(1) specialists and planners in developing countries consult regularly to de- 

 termine their priority needs for advisory services, institution building, project 

 aid, and the operation of educational and other public services, and (2) develop- 

 ing countries program technical assistance requirements by spelling out the 

 sequence of operations, the performance objectives of the i)ersonnel and of the 

 training schemes, the cost of each stage, and their own commitments to institu- 

 tional and structural change, (p. 183) 



It was also important that technical assistance be used to facilitate 

 the transfer of technology and management. To this end, it was recom- 

 mended "that international technical assistance be strengthened by 

 the creation of national and international corps of technical assistance 

 personnel with adequate career opportunities." (p. 185) 



PRESIDENTIAL POLICY FOR FUTURE TECHNICAL AID 



The President acted on the Peterson Report in a message to Con- 

 gress, September 15, 1970, on "Foreign Assistance for the 'Seventies.' " 

 In it he accepted virtually in full the report's recommendations. With 

 respect to the proposed U.S. International Development Institute, he 

 announced : 



I shall propose establishment [of the Institute! which will bring U.S. science 

 and technology to bear on the problems of development. 



The Institute will fill a major gap in the international development network. 

 It will match our vast talents in science and technology with institutions and 

 problems abroad. Research has created the basis for the Green Revolution — the 

 major breakthrough in agricultural production — ^but continued, progress in the 

 1970's will require the lower income countries to deal with more, and more com- 

 plex, problems. The Institute will concentrate on selected areas and focus U.S. 



