774 



tions. The dynamic changes during the nineteenth century, through 

 the development of transportation, massive emigration to the United 

 States, the opening up of unused acreages of fertile lands in the 

 American West, and the development of world trade in agricultural 

 surpluses, all helped the industrialized nations to satisfy the needs of 

 their populations for food. Countries like England and Germany 

 could concentrate on the development of industry and on the furnish- 

 ing of investment capital and services to other countries, secure in 

 the knowledge that their populations could be fed on imported food- 

 stuffs, particularly on cheap American grain. 



The combination of these factors contributed to a sense of self- 

 confidence that these nations need not fear that mass hunger would 

 result even if their populations should greatly increase. But as a 

 matter of fact, in most of the countries of Western Europe, popula- 

 tions remained relatively stable after 1900 : After World War I, the 

 populations of France, Sweden, and Ireland actually declined. 



Only under the dislocations of war or revolution, or in the rela- 

 tively less developed territory of Russia, were there even localized 

 episodes of actual food shortage. When these occurred, as in Russia in 

 1891-1802 and in 1921-1922, they were not perceived as resulting from 

 an excess of population over food supply. 



However, the fortunate experiences in Western Europe and the 

 United States obscure the fact that for most of the world, and most 

 notably amongst the huge populations of Asia, the availability of 

 food has been close to the bare minimum necessary to sustain life. 



The Malthiismn Hypothesis and Its Revival 



When Malthus first published his Essay on Population^ he proposed 

 the j^oorly supported hypothesis that population increased geometri- 

 cally ( 1. 2, 4, 8, 16 . . . ) while food resources increased arithmetically 

 (1,2,3.4,5 . . . ). In the more fully documented later editions of his 

 work, he abandoned this idea in favor of the more general assertion 

 that population always tended to outrun food supply. If this theory 

 was not borne out in Western industrialized society, there appears to 

 be some evidence in support of it in the LDCs, where famines still re- 

 cui* M if h dismaying frequency.® 



It is an easy assumption that the one missing factor that distinguishes 

 developed countries from underdeveloped countries, famine-free coun- 

 tries from famine-prone countries, is technology. Technology enables 

 expanded agricultural output and the control of numbers of progeny. 

 Unquestionably, therefore, technology plays a powerful role in ena- 

 bling a population to achieve and sustain a satisfactory food/popula- 

 tion balance. 



However, the conscious and deliberate balancing of food and popu- 

 lation, and the systematic application of technology to agriculture (or 

 to the limiting of population), are difficult policies to implement in a 

 developing country. Many obstacles stand in the way. Among the 

 most notable is the general deficiency in knowledge of the complex 



• In India there were particularly severe famines In 1838. 18B1. 1866. 1869. 1874. 1876- 

 1878. and 1899-1901. In China, there were such famines in 1877-1878. 1887. 1889. and 

 1916. Tt is estimated that 5 million persons perished In the Indian famine In 1876-1878. 

 and 9.r> million in the North China famine of 1877-1878. In such countries, where trans- 

 portntlon and distribution systenis are poorly developed, localized famines arc likely to 

 occur In any .vear. 



