818 



already evident ; how they are managed will determine to a substan^ , 

 tial degree the ultimate outcome of the Green Revolution. Managed 

 with skill, the Green Revolution can do much to reduce malnutrition 

 and hunger that is endemic in the underdeveloped countries. But if 

 these changes are mismanaged, if the developing countries are not able 

 to cope effectively and in timely fashion with the social implications 

 of the Green Revolution, the promise of the massive agricultural trans- 

 formation could be aborted and even turn into a disaster. One of the 

 most important tasks for U.S. diplomacy, therefore, would seem to be 

 that of lending encouragement and support to the efforts of the less 

 developed countries to persuade their populations to adapt systemati- 

 cally to the changes necessitated by innovative agricultural technology. 

 When prodding is called for, experience has shown that by and 

 large the United States needs to exercise its influence as unobtrusively 

 as possible, and preferably through indirect channels such as the 

 FAO or the World Bank. 



The Green Revolution will not solve the food/population problem. 

 Rather, it extends the margin of time in which programs of family 

 planning can be brought to a peak of effectiveness. Leaders in the 

 underdeveloped countries are beginning to perceive the problems ac- 

 companying the Green Revolution, such as, the forcing of the poorest 

 jxeasants off the land, the huge capital investments required for irriga-, 

 tiori, the need to modernize now inadequate marketmg systems, the 

 requirement for educating the farmers to new skills, and the need for 

 institutional reforms.** In addition, as the Second World Food Con- 

 gress recently demonstrated, these leaders attribute world hunger to 

 more than the inadequacy of foodstuffs. They see such shortages as 

 caused by a lack of purchasing power, both internal and external, 

 which/can be overcome by liberalized trade policies on the part of the 

 advanced countries, coupled with a broad attack on the root causes 

 of world poverty. 



Trade Demands of the LDCs 



Breaking down barriers to their exports has now become the focus of 

 trade policy by the underdeveloped countries. Through the United Na- 

 tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) they have 

 demanded preferential treatment by the developed countries. Their de- 

 mand has been accepted in principle by the developed countries, includ- 

 ing the United States, but little visible progress has been made toward 

 this goal. The Latin American countries, in the so-called Consensus of 

 Vina del Mar in May 1969, unanimously arrived at a list of demands 

 for U.S. action to correct what they saw as inequities existing in the 

 economic relations; between this country and its neighbors to the south. 



Despite these demands, i^ =eems questionable to suppose that the 

 LDCs will succeed in becominjr substantial grain exporters in the 

 near future. The FAO, working on the assumption that the developed 

 countries would continue th^ir present production and trade policies, 

 foresees a growth in agricultural exports from the XjDCs to the de- 

 veloped countries of only 1.8 percent per annum, from 1962 to 1975. 



. " Wharfon. "The Grepn Revolution : Cornticopla or Pandorp's Box?"- Op. clt. paee'^ 4A4- 

 47fi. 



