1007 



he is to be able to compare notes with his Soviet colleagues. Knowledge of socio- 

 political subjects, on the other hand, is hkely to make it difficult to establish and 

 maintain useful relations with Soviet counterparts.^^e 



A quantitative indication of mutual restrictions is the number of 

 rejections made by each country for scientific visitors proposed by the 

 other. Apparently, more Americans than Soviets have been rejected 

 since initiation of the exchange program. Rejected Americans gen- 

 erally have planned to conduct actiWties in the areas of physics 

 and mathematics. The same pattern is reflected in American rejections 

 of Soviet visitors. According to the National Academy of Sciences, 

 "Rarely have we been informed of the basis for rejection of American 

 apphcants . . . .'^\ During periods of 1959-1963, 1963-1967, and 

 1967-1970, Soviet visitors rejected by the United States numbered 

 respectively 2, 7, and 0; comparable Soviet rejections of American 

 %dsitors were 0, 12, and 5."* 



Although scientific exchange programs do not appear to be unduly 

 influenced by clandestine information gathering activities, it is ob- 

 vious that these activities may influence the restrictions the host 

 places on the activities of the foreign visitor and on the host country's 

 attitudes toward foreign scientific visitors. In his recent review of 

 Soviet-American exchange programs, Byrnes did not establish a link 

 between intelUgence activities and the activities of American scholars 

 in the Soviet Union. However, he remarked: "The CIA and FBI, 

 which have important national responsibihties, are interested in in- 

 formation concerning Soviet strengths and weaknesses," ^^ One 

 possible motive behind FBI efforts in this area, according to a news re- 

 port, is to survey Americans who have gone to the U.S.S.R. in an 

 attempt to obtain information about whether they might have been 

 approached for recruitment by Soviet IntelUgence Services.*^" 



«• Frederick Barghoorn, "U.S. Scientists in Russia," Science News 98, no. 12, p. 250. There is almost 

 no detailed information available on Soviet formal and informal restrictions applicable to exchange pro- 

 grams. General sources are: U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Sino-Soviet 

 Bloc Exchanges with the Free World in 1989, 1%1, (IntelUgence Report No. 8401), 39 pp. Reprinted In: U.S., 

 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, MxUual Ediicational and Cvitural Exchange Act: Hear- 

 ings, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 165-209. See also: "Soviet Programs in International Education (Wash- 

 ington: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1971, 41 pp. 



*w Philip Handler, "The Moscow Agreements and U.S. -Soviet Scientific Relationships," op. cit., p. 8. 

 Dr. John Hardt reports that rejections are made especially of Russian-speaking American economists and 

 social scientists who specialize in Soviet studies. (Interview.) 



«* Data extrapolated from details list provided by NAS. 



*2» Americans who apply for U.S. Soviet exchange programs are evaluated, according to Lawrence Mitchell, 

 Director, U.S. Soviet Eastern European Staff, NAS, solely on the basis of their scientific qualifications 

 are not subject to anyideologicalor political screening. (Interview March 16, 1971). I n fact although they are 

 encouraged to have a language capability, competence in Russian is not a requirement for exchange. (Ibid.) 

 American exchange applicants are required to submit three confidential reference forms in support of their 

 application. No questions are asked on the form relating to political or ideological convictions of the appli- 

 cants. However, they are evaluated on their ability to work in the foreign culture. According to the Confi- 

 dential Reference form: "The special pressures and responsibilities imposed by the Soviet or Eastern Euro- 

 pean environment require that the exchange participant be an exceptionally mature and emotionally stable 

 person. In these respects, do you consider the applicant (and any dependents who might accompany him) 

 completely qualified for an extended stay?" 



*» Morton Mintz, "U.S. Visitors to Soviet Union Probed by FBI," Washington Post (April 1, 1972), p. A-2. 

 Mintz's account of FBI surveillance of Americans who have gone to the USSR is based upon information 

 contained in an internal FBI memo, dated Nov. 17, 1969 that was stolen from the FBI oflSce in Media, Pa., 

 1971. Mintz reports in part: "The FBI Investigates students, teachers, and scientists who spend a month or 

 longer in the Soviet Union. The purpose of the investigations 'Is to identify them and determine whether 

 any ofthem have been approached for recruitment by the Soviet Intelligence Services.' ... In some eases, 

 at least, the FBI is known to attempt to learn from returned travelers such information as the identity of 

 Russians they met and the nature of their relationships (a Russian's request for a book could be the nucleus 

 of a recruitment eflort, as the FBI is understood to see it), and whether the visitors while in Russia, may have 

 been entrapped in some embarassing situation that the Soviet intelligence might try to exploit some day. 

 ... A cursory check by The Washington Post showed that if such investigations are in fact made, it is 

 rare for the subject to be interviewed or for him to learn of the investigation." 



