1371 



Concentration of attention to science and technology matters in 

 OES versus diffusion throughout the Department of State? 



Emphasis on recruiting speciaUsts or training generaHsts? (Relations 

 with the Foreign Service Institute?) 



The building of an OES data base and research capability or en- 

 couragement of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to do so, 

 with imputs from the science attaches? 



The development of in-house policy analj^sis capability, or reliance 

 on advisory committee and contract studies, or both? 



Encouragement of bilateral or multilateral science and technology 

 relations, or both, or neither? 



Policy regarding use and development of the attache system — 

 fewer and larger teams or wider coverage? What services to be ex- 

 pected from them? What arrangements to enhance the use of their 

 product in the U.S.? 



The allocation of emphasis as between the established functions of 

 SCI and the mission functions of oceans, environment, and popula- 

 tion matters stressed by Members of the Senate? 



As this study was being uTitten, Dr. Ray was too recently in the 

 post to have determined what shape her organization would eventually 

 take, or what program priorities would be adopted. It is probable 

 that her initial concern would be to meld the added new elements into 

 the core group represented by the former SCI. 



By early April, conversations with staff members of OES gave an 

 indication that consideration was being given to establishment of 

 some kind of a small reserved staff or longer range policy analysis 

 within the Bureau. It would be interesting to see whether the think- 

 ing in OES is that such an activity might serve to answer the kind of 

 criticism expressed in a 1972 analysis by Howard Margolis of the 

 Institute for Defense Analyses. He observed that "there seems to be 

 no one dealing with policy in the department whose standing depends 

 substantially on his ability to make and provide his principal with 

 a line of argument to effectively defend judgments on the relationship 

 of technical considerations to larger political issues." Parentheticall.y 

 he noted that "the most likely exception" was the "Science Bureau" 

 but that it did not have access at that time to "high policy areas to 

 which technical arguments are likel}^ to be relevant. . . ." So he 

 concluded : 



Consequently there is, I believe, no one at State who has the combination of 

 access to high policy levels, interest in policy questions, and a particular stake 

 and interest in how technical arguments bear on such questions. But it is only 

 that sort of person who is likelj^ to be in the position of credibly telling senior 

 State officials when and why the technical assessments they take for granted maj'' 

 be unsound, or when and why the assessments they are inclined to dismiss as 

 inconsequential really are important. 



This has, I think, the effect of weakening State's capacity as an organization 

 to adequatelj^ assess some policy issues, and it weakens State's ability to play a 

 leading role in advocating its view on any policy issue on which other agencies 

 can bring technical arguments to bear.'* 



" Howard Margolis, N'otis on. Technical Advice and Political Issues, Paper P-841, International and Social 

 Studies Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1972, p. 63. 



