1413 



ment, Senator Jackson declared that "No task is more urgent than 

 improving the effectiveness of the Department of State." 



In our system, there can be no satisfactory substitute for a Secretary of State 

 willing and able to exercise hi? leadership across the full range of national security 

 matters, as they relate to foreign poliC3^ The Secretary, assisted by his Depart- 

 ment, must bear the chief responsibilit}^ for bringing new policy initiatives to the 

 President's desk, and for overseeing and coordinating our manifold foreign policy 

 activities on the President's behalf. 



State is not doing enough in asserting its leadership across the whole front of 

 foreign policy. Neither is it doing enough in staffing itself for such leadership. 



State needs more respect for comprehensive forward planning. The Department 

 as a whole attaches too little importance to looking ahead in foreign policj% and 

 is too wedded to a philosophy of reacting to problems as they arise. The Policy 

 Planning Council is not now in the mainstream of policymaking. 



State needs more officials who are good executive managers — and who are 

 broadly experienced in dealing with the full range of national security problems 

 which now engage the Department. The administration of foreign policy has 

 become "big business." This places a high premium on the ability to manage large 

 scale enterprises — to make decisions promptly and decisively, to delegate, and 

 to monitor. 



This need for "take charge" men is particularly urgent down through the 

 Assistant Secretary level and at our large missions abroad. Round pegs in square 

 holes are a luxury we cannot aflford.^^e 



An appeal for a more active role in the strategic diplomatic use of 

 science and technology was voiced in 1965 by Dr. Killian in an address 

 to the first science seminar held by the Foreign Service Institute. He 

 said : 



All of us^whethcr we be in the scientific, academic, or government communi- 

 ties in this country and abroad — are still in the kindergarten stage in really under- 

 standing how to use science and technology in foreign affairs. There is the diplo- 

 matic opportunity to grasp a powerful new lever to advance our national interest 

 in the world arena. The United States has exceptional technical resources that are 

 understood all over the world, both by advanced peoples and by less-advanced 

 peoples. This scientific and technological strength is among the most conspicuous, 

 most admired, and most persuasive features of the American landscape — more so, 

 to other peoples, than even our cherished democratic system. In this striking fact, 

 in the worldwide appreciation of the quality of our science and technology and the 

 education which supports it, lies a unique diplomatic opportunity, if we can but 

 cultivate the complicated skills and understanding required to exploit it, and 

 create the conditions where these skills are really utilized in agencies concerned 

 with affairs abroad. The power of our science and technology to serve national 

 goals also presents to the State Department a compelling reason to pursue policies 

 designed to maintain and augment this quality.i^' 



However, by 1969, a critic observed from a review of contemporary 

 literature that: "As President Kennedy became disenchanted with the 

 State Department, he relied increasingly on his owti staff for coordina- 

 tion in selected policy areas." According to this source: 



The Kennedy regime overloaded the small White House staff, drawing both 

 President and staff into detailed and distracting administration, without com- 

 pensating progress in the establishment cf guidelines for lower-echelon action. 

 Agency resources were ignored or underutilized. Crisis management was impaired 

 as the Kennedy system experienced difficulty in responding to more than one sensi- 

 tive area at a time, a problem that became acute under the Johnson Administra- 

 tion as the Vietnam War grew progressively intractable. '^^ 



Reorganization of the Foreign Service to meet the demands of 

 modern diplomacy has been a favorite sport for a long time. There 



125 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organhing for National Security: 

 Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, 87th Cong., 1st sess., November 15, 1961, p. 4. 

 (Committee print.) 



'" J. R. Killian, Jr., "Science in the State Department: A Practical Imperative," Bulletin of the Atomic 

 Scientists 21 . no. 5 (May 19&5) , p. 13. 



i-s Edward A. Kolodziej, "The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications," Public Admin- 

 istration Review 29, no. 6 (November/December 1969), p. 578. 



