1433 



involved — which nrc frequently conflicting — and establishing their appropriate 

 priorities. We must, of course, protect our national security. Where our proper 

 course lies as regards our industrial competitiveness in the world market has been 

 widely debated. We do not believe in prc)tectionism as the basis for continued 

 U.S. leadership in advanced technology. You know, better than most, that con- 

 tinued technological leadership in a dynamic economy rests on our own innovative 

 capabilitie , and not on attempts to weaken or limit the technological enterprise 

 of other nations. When the benefits of our own enterprise are made available to 

 others, we do ask that the quid pro quo include an ai>propriate financial recompense 

 for the R&D investments, public and private, which we have made. This is 

 essential to our continued innovative efforts."* 



Historically, the Department of State has not been e.specially 

 alert to the opportunities for technological diplomacy. As Dean 

 Acheson pointed out, one of the most coherent programs of postwar 

 diplomac}' since 1950 was initiated outside of the Department and 

 accepted only reluctantly within it. Wrote Acheson: 



The State Department was slow in realizing the importance of Point Four and 

 in getting a program in motion. Technological help for developing countries had 

 for some time been a feature of the good-neighbor policy in the western hemi- 

 sphere. The idea of expounding it on a worldwide l^asis originated with ClarTc 

 Clifford, then Counsel to the President, who included it in a draft of the inaugural 

 address sent to Acting Secretary [of State] Robert Lovett and Paul Nitze of the 

 Policy Planning Stafl'. They were neither enthusiastic nor impressed with its 

 utility. Nevertheless, it went into the inaugural address and became much talked 

 about. [And, he remarked later] Although the program continued to do a creditable 

 job, it remained the Cinderella of the foreign aid family.'" 



In their joint examination of "Science Advice in the Wliite House," 

 Eugene B. Skolnikoff and Harvey Brooks called attention to the need 

 for a stronger scientific unit in the Department of State and a stronger 

 scientific advisory mechanism in the White House, to construct n 

 forward-looking international policy for science and technology. 



When one looks at the entire federal R&D budget [they wrote], a curious fact 

 emerges. A substantial portion of that budget, well more than half, is committed 

 to missions which have strong foreign policy motivations and rei)ercu.ssions: 

 primarily the Department uf Defense, some of the APX\ and some of NASA. A 

 good portion of the rest goes for work in subjects that will aflFect foreign jjolicy 

 quite directly: agriculture, energy, oceanography, foreign trade, and population 

 to mentif)n just a few. 



However, given this strong foreign policy motivation for federal R&D, the 

 Department of State, the one department of government most concerned with 

 foreign policy below the President, has essentially no voice in the allocation of 

 thf>se R&D resources. Instead, other departments and agencies rely on their 

 own interpretation of what serves foreign policy goals in setting their R&D 

 objectives. The President and Executive Office agencies (NSC and 0MB) oversee 

 the process, but only in the most general terms. The Department of State merely 

 has to cope with the consequences. '^^ 



i« This issup of U.S. national intniests in U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade was examined in some depth by Dr. John 

 Uardt in a study for this series. See: U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Soviet Commercial 

 Relations: The Interplay ofEconoviics. Techvedogy Transfer, and Diplomacy, in the series, Science, Technology, 

 and American Di plomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Securityj'olicy and Scientific 

 Developments, by John Pi Hardt and George D. Holliday, Congressional Research Service, 

 Library of Congress, 1973. See vol. I, pp. .52.5-606. 



I" Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation, Mu Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and 

 Company. 1969), pp. 265-266. For an extended discussion of the Point IV Program see: U.S. Congress, 

 C ommittee on Scit-nce and Astronautics, Technical Information for Congress, prepared bv tlie Science Policy 

 Keseaich Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, April 1.5. 1971."Tommittee print.) 

 t-ee especially p. 7.5: " To begin with the program was not recognized as involving scientific problems at all. 

 .Much of the debberation centered on political, economic, and miUtarv considerations such as the need to 

 contain comiTiumsm. the need to expand U.S. markets, and the development of secure sources of .strategic 

 materials. 'Capital for inve.<:tment rather than technology was the main item of export considered.) 

 ^M tugene B. Skolnikoff and Harvey Brooks, "Science Advice in the White House.'— Continuation of » 

 Debate, Science, January 10, 1975, p. 40. 



