IX. Congressional Concern With Science in the Department 



OF State 



One student has observed: "Significantly, it was Congress and not 

 the State Department or the White House that first saw the broad 

 impHcations of science's penetration into all segments of foreign 

 policy.'^* This awareness took the form of a study planned by the 

 staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1958 and com- 

 missioned from Stanford Research Institute (SRI) January 24, 1959. 

 It was scheduled for delivery in 6 months and called for ". . . an 

 imaginative but scientificalh^ sound examination of possible scientific 

 developments during the next decade, with an estimate of the impact 

 of such developments on foreign relations." 



Congressional Contract To Study Science Impacts on Foreign Policy 



The contractor v/as asked to identify possible favorable and un- 

 favorable impacts of scientific developments on U.S. foreign policy 

 and to forecast future foreign policy problems resulting from such 

 developments. Among the examples suggested were nuclear modifica- 

 tion of geography, weather modification, increased pollution, popula- 

 tion control, new food and energy sources, exploitation of seabed 

 minerals, uses of outer space, and communication technologies. 



The SRI report ^^^ offered three main conclusions: 



1. Scientific developments in the next decade will give rise to or intensify many 

 problenis that must engage the attention of foreign policy planners. Scientific 

 developments will also help solve foreign policy problems. But the outlook is that 

 the progress of science and technology will do more to create or intensify than to 

 ameliorate such problems, unless deliberate policy measures are taken. 



2. The national interest requires a more conscious direction of scientific activitj'^ 

 in waj's likely to assist in the achievement of America's international goals. The 

 security and well-being of the United States call for a reappraisal of present 

 allocations of scientific and technological effort with a view to directing more 

 effort toward nonmilitary foreign policy challenges. 



3. Foreign policy planning of the broadest kind, making use of the best scientific 

 assistance, will be a critical requirement in the years ahead. This planning should 

 include continual review of prospective scientific developments and their signifi- 

 cance for international relations. 



Science, said the report, had produced a global environment of 

 political and economic interdependence, shifts in national power- 

 relationships and the relative importance of geographic areas (e.g. 

 petroleum-bearing areas of the Middle East). "Scientific progress 

 itself has become a matter of concern to foreign policymakers, be- 

 cause of its important relation to military power, to economic relation- 

 ships, and to a nation's prestige." And, finalh^ it had affected the 

 instruments and methods of foreign policy through rapid travel and 

 instant communications. "B}^ far the most important channel through 



188 Donald W. Cox, America's New Policy Makers: The Scientists' Rise to Power (New York: Chilton Com- 

 pany, Chilton Books, 1964), n. 8 i. 



'8' Stanford Research Institute, Possible NonmilitaTy Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact, 

 on Foreign Policy Problems of the Uiiitei Slates fJuly 1959), printed in: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee 

 on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy: Compilation of Studies Nos. 1-8, Both Cong., 2nd sess., 

 September 1960, pp. 99-198. (Committee print.) 



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