1488 



policies to deal with global or international problems calling for 

 technological resolution, e.g., satellite surveys of pollution sources, 

 and diffusion patterns; and (4) policies employing science and tech- 

 nology to alter diplomatic relationship in some beneficial way, e.g., 

 U.S.-U.S.S.R. science agreement to further detente. 



There have been numerous references in the literature to the need 

 to exploit the fourth of these tj'pes of technical diplomacy, and a few 

 examples can be recalled, such as the "Open Skies" and "Atoms for 

 jPeace" proposals of President Eisenhower, the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 

 space collaboration proposal of President Kennedy, the Mekong de- 

 velopment offer of President Johnson, and the numerous bilateral 

 science agreements and the proposal for a technical institute for 

 foreign aid advanced by President Nixon. 



However, in recent years the quest for science-based diplomatic 

 initiatives has neither been pushed strongly nor has it been par- 

 ticularly fruitful. Except in the area of bilateral agreements, where 

 the device ma}^ actually have been pushed beyond a capacity to 

 manage and support it properly, the creation of diplomatic initiatives 

 to exploit U.S. scientific and technological preeminence has not been 

 extensive. Certainly it is not described as particularly rewarding or 

 inventive. 



Various proposals have been made, from time to time, that an 

 aggressive program be instituted to create on demand initiatives to 

 further U.S. diplomatic goals. For example, a presidential task force, 

 April 1970, recommended "that the President continue to encourage 

 the major Departments and Agencies of Government to suggest 

 specific new science-based foreign policy initiatives and opportunities 

 for international cooperation."^^' 



Also, during his tenure as Presidential Science Adviser, Dr. Edward 

 E. David, Jr., in 1971 asked the members of the FCST International 

 vSubcommittee to come up with suggestions for possible consideration 

 in the White House, with emphasis on programs or projects of mutual 

 benefit, as well as ways to strengthen U.S. abilit}^ to respond to 

 international scientific or technological opportunities. 



It is not evident whether the general want of success of this effort 

 to elicit fresh ideas for diplomatic initiatives has been attributable to 

 the lack of appropriate organization for creativit}^ to the uncertainty 

 as to the reception of bold and unconventional concepts, or perhaps 

 an asserted tendency of the diplomatic community toward a reactive 

 rather than innovative style of thought. Certainly there exist numer- 

 ous areas in which opportunity for innovation is offered, and in which 

 the United States has unique competence. For example, the World 

 Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and 

 various regional organizations of the United Nations have programs 

 that lag seriously and could be greatly strengthened at relatively 

 modest cost. The staffing of international organizations with technical 

 personnel from the United States as a form of training for their 

 future participation in the technical elements of the Department 

 of State or the Foreign Service might be considered. Positive action 

 on the U.N. university proposal, or such aspects of it as studies 



207 U.S., President's Task Force on Science Policy, Science and Technology: Tools for Progress (Washington, 

 D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1970), p. 42. 



