coherent expression of their understanding and coherent advice to the manager 

 and administrator. Alternative policies emerge that are qualitatively different 

 from those previously devised and an effective range of comprehensible choice 

 is provided for decision. But we discovered as well that the quality of the 

 science itself was radically improved. This new discovery emerged because 

 implementation demands that which is simple, clear and relevant. Above all, 

 science seeks for understanding. And simplicity is the hallmark of under- 

 standing. 



2. Methods. 



Much of the theory and methodological developments took place in collab- 

 oration with outstanding analysts at IIASA with Dantzig of optimization 

 fame, Raiffa of decision theory, and Koopmans of economics. The revolution 

 in our thinking concerning concepts and methods was triggered by them and is 

 discussed in detail elsewhere.'^ 



Optimization and techniques of decision and utility theory are modestly 

 useful so long as they are not believed. The number of variables and non- 

 linearities encountered in resource problems exceed the capacity of existing 

 techniques, if simplifying assumptions are made, they do provide interesting 

 starting points to direct endeavor. But those very simplifications can arouse 

 justifiable contempt in the mind of the decisionmaker as he exposes their gross 

 impracticality. 



There should not be one model. There should be several, since all models are 

 lies — at best, partial representations of reality. Each provides a different 

 perceptual window. Truth lies at the intersection of conflicting lies. Such 

 models cannot be validated, they can only be invalidated, just as hypotheses 

 can only be disproved. The key therefore is to establish the limits of credibility 

 of the model by putting it at risk. And that can be done in both public and 

 private settings. As a consequence, the analyst must put himself at risk as well, 

 in order to establish his own limits of credibilitv for his publics. 



3. Insiitulions. 



For all its challenges, fun, and value, implementation is agony. For every day 

 of analysis, implementation can require six days of communication, mutual 

 learning, trial-and-error, and interaction at all decision and staff levels. 

 Moreover it requires as much creativity and professionalism as does analysis 

 and requires considerably more wisdom and patience. 



The effectiveness of implementation is critically dependent on a "wise man" 

 who is an integral part of the institutional environment. His position need not 

 be one of obvious authority, but he must have intluenceand the respect (even if 

 grudging) of other institutional actors. But those actors are organisms like any 

 other, and as any good biologist must recognize, have well-developed survival 

 responses. Many of these, legitimately or illegitmately, frustrate innovation 

 and change. Some of the frustration comes from experts, managers or 

 decisionmakers who simply are motivated to continue doing familiar things 

 irrespective of their need or value to seem to be busy and useful. How many 

 data collection programs and field surveys, for example, are dominated by the 

 desire to measure that which is easily measurable and not that which is 

 important? Some frustrations come from territorial defense. Progress of the 

 budworm study, for example, was profoundly slowed by senior management 

 of the Canadian federal research agency who demanded that sufficient 

 recognition be given to their "contribution" by setting their terms for 

 involvement of the provincial agency. That stopped progress toward imple- 

 mentation for nearly two years.'" Similarly, agencies attempt to protect 

 negotiating positions. Senior management of a key agency of the State of 

 Nevada refused to participate or have his staff participate in a workshop for 



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