54 



policy to accelerate this beneficial trend since the funds 

 are still concentrated in too few institutions in too few 

 areas of the country. We want to find excellence and build 

 it up wherever it is found so that creative centers of excel- 

 lence may grow in every part of the nation. 44 



President Johnson's call for the redistribution of science funding 

 was prompted in part by a recommendation made to the Federal 

 Council for Science and Technology by the National Science Foun- 

 dation earlier in 1965. 45 In April of that year, the NSF began issu- 

 ing Science Development ("centers of excellence") Awards to col- 

 leges and universities that had not traditionally received large Fed- 

 eral science funding. Johnson's statement of 14 September 1965 re- 

 inforced this program and prompted the National Institutes of 

 Health to respond in a similar fashion by beginning its Health Sci- 

 ence Advancement Awards. The Department of Defense complied 

 by establishing Project THEMIS in 1967 — which was an attempt to 

 provide defense-related research programs to universities not previ- 

 ously so engaged. 46 



The other major science policy concern of the Johnson Adminis- 

 tration involved the application of research. There was a widely- 

 held belief among White House staff members that publicly-fi- 

 nanced research should be socially relevant — that the Govern- 

 ment's heavy investments in science should result in tangible pay- 

 offs. This belief was clearly articulated in President Johnson's 15 

 June 1966 speech on the launching of Medicare in which he called 

 for more immediate results from the research sponsored by the Na- 

 tional Institutes of Health. He said: 



Now actually a great deal of basic research has been 

 done. I have been participating in the appropriations for 

 years in this field. But I think the time has now come to 

 zero in on the targets by trying to get this knowledge fully 

 applied. There are hundreds of millions of dollars that 

 have been spent on laboratory research that may be made 

 useful to human beings here if large-scale trials on pa- 

 tients are initiated in promising areas. Now Presidents, in 

 my judgment, need to show more interest in what the spe- 

 cific results of medical research are during their lifetime, 

 during their administration. I am going to show an inter- 

 est in the results. Whether we get any or not I am going to 

 show an interest in them. 47 



44 Lyndon B. Johnson., "Statement of the President to the Cabinet on Strengthening the Aca- 

 demic Capability for Science throughout the Nation," 14 September 1965, reprinted in James L. 

 Penick, Jr., et al. (eds.). The Politics of American Science: 1939 to the Present (Cambridge: The 

 MIT Press, 1972), pp. 334-336. 



45 See "Administrative History of the National Science Foundation during the Administration 

 of President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963— January 1969," unpublished manuscript, Na- 

 tional Science Foundation, pp. 239-241. My thanks to NSF Historian J. Merton England for 

 bringing this document to my attention. 



46 See Lambright, Presidential Management of Science and Technology, pp. 80-84; and U.S. 

 Department of Defense, Project THEMIS (Washington: Office of the Director of Defense Re- 

 search and Engineering, 1967). 



47 See Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at a Meeting with Medical and Hospital Leaders to Pre- 

 pare for the Launching of Medicare," 15 June 1966, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 

 United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, 2 books (Washington: GPO, 1967), book I, p. 610. 



