65 



dent was interested in improving the Administration's ability to co- 

 ordinate the nation's research activities. To assist him in this en- 

 deavor, Nixon created a Task Force on Science Policy in October 

 1969. 31 In its report to the White House, the Task Force stated 

 that: 



National policy governing science and technology should 

 in principle be a mirror image of our national goals and 

 purposes. Science policy should in part be a statement 

 about the priorities of the future. 32 



In order to accomplish this objective, the Task Force recommended 

 that further support and responsibility be given to the President's 

 Science Advisory Committee and the Office of Science and Technol- 

 ogy. The Daddario Subcommittee was in complete agreement with 

 the Task Force when it, too, recommended that the President's sci- 

 ence advisory offices be "strengthened both as to staffing and mis- 

 sion." 33 



President Nixon, however, did not like the fact that his science 

 advisers had often disagreed with him on issues central to his over- 

 all political objectives. The most notable examples were the scien- 

 tists' objections to the supersonic transport (SST) and anti-ballastic 

 missile (ABM) programs. Nixon also disliked the continued opposi- 

 tion to the Vietnam War expressed by many within the scientific 

 community. 34 As a result, the President rejected the concurring 

 recommendations of the Daddario Subcommittee and his own Task 

 Force on Science Policy, choosing instead to abolish both PSAC and 

 OST through his Reorganization Plan submitted on 27 January 

 1973. Nixon's reorganization — which was an attempt to strengthen 

 the Presidency by increasing the size of the White House staff and 

 consolidating its decisionmaking apparatus — affected many areas 

 of domestic policymaking besides research, but the message it sent 

 to the science policy community generated tremendous controver- 

 sy. 35 



With the dismantling of PSAC, the role of Presidential science 

 adviser was given to the Director of the National Science Founda- 

 tion, at that time, H. Guyford Stever. Stever accepted this dual re- 

 sponsibility and was assisted in his Presidential advisory responsi- 

 bilities by NSF's Science and Technology Policy Office. 



Congress responded to the President's actions by looking into the 

 legislative possibilities of restoring the White House Office of Sci- 

 ence and Technology. Beginning in mid-1973, the House Committee 

 on Science and Astronautics began a two-year review of science 

 policy with the main focus on replacing the dismantled OST. This 



3 ' Ruben F. Mettler, Executive Vice President of TRW, Inc. (subsequently elected President of 

 TRW), was appointed chairman of the Task Force. 



32 U.S. President's Task Force on Science Policy, Science and Technology: Tools for Progress 

 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 9. 



33 Toward a Science Policy for the United States, p. 11. 



34 See David Z. Beckler, "The Precarious Life of Science in the White House," Daedalus, 103, 

 (Summer 1974), 115-134; and James R. Killian, Jr., The Education of a College President: A 

 Memoir (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), passim. 



35 For a general account of the dismantling of PSAC and OST, as well as the various re- 

 sponses to that, see John F. Burby, "Science Report: Congress Ready to Move on New Federal 

 R&D Structure," National Journal, 6 (December 14, 1974), 1871-1876. The general development 

 of science policy during the Nixon Administration is discussed in Sylvia D. Fries, "The Ideology 

 of Science during the Nixon Years: 1970-76," Social Studies of Science, 14 (1984), 323-341. 



