21 



nation's educational system and especially to strengthening gradu- 

 ate science programs at the major research universities. 



Congress and Science Policy 



Congressional involvement in the formation of science policy 

 during the war was most vigorously pursued within the Senate 

 Committee on Military Affairs. Senator Harley M. Kilgore, Demo- 

 crat of West Virginia and chair of the Subcommittee on War Mobi- 

 lization, headed this effort by arranging a series of hearings in 

 1942, 1943, and 1945 on the general issue of Government support of 

 scientific research and development. 12 The 1942 hearings were con- 

 cerned with organizing the nation's technological talent for the 

 purpose of assisting the war effort. Kilgore introduced legislation 

 at that time to create an Office of Technological Mobilization. Kil- 

 gore expanded these goals to science in 1943 when he submitted a 

 Science Mobilization bill. His 1945 hearings were conducted after 

 the end of the war, at which time he introduced legislation to 

 create a National Science Foundation. 



Kilgore was a staunch supporter of the New Deal and was inter- 

 ested in the linkage of scientific research to industry. He was also 

 interested in the issue of geographical distribution of scientific re- 

 search funding. Because the OSRD had not concerned itself with 

 either geographical distribution or industrial research — nor with 

 the sciences, such as biology and geology, that did not fit squarely 

 within the war effort — the Kilgore subcommittee concentrated on 

 the creation of a broader science organization to replace the OSRD 

 after the war. Herbert Schimmel, a physicist on the subcommittee 

 staff, was instrumental in shaping the hearings and legislation put 

 forth by Kilgore. Knowing that the OSRD would be disbanded after 

 the war, Kilgore proposed the creation of a central agency to deal 

 with matters relating to scientific research and development. This 

 plan was presented in his subcommittee's 1945 report, The Govern- 

 ment's Wartime Research and Development, known widely as the 

 "Kilgore Report." 13 



The Bush Report 



The Kilgore hearings naturally aroused the interest of Vannevar 

 Bush and other leaders of the scientific community. This was espe- 

 cially true because of Bush's strong disagreement with many as- 

 pects of Kilgore's proposals. Indeed, because there was a fundamen- 

 tal shift of scientific support in the offing, the scientists had an im- 

 portant stake in entering the public debate, if not in presenting a 



poses of the project were: (1) to deny this scientific and technical expertise to the Russians; and 

 (2) to benefit American interests, primarily in military applications. Ultimately, 642 German sci- 

 entists and technicians were brought to the United States under the auspices of the project, 

 many of them coming after 1948. See Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists 

 and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971). 



12 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Subcommittee on War Mobiliza- 

 tion, Scientific and Technological Mobilization, (78th Congress, 1st session. Washington: GPO, 

 1943); and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Subcommittee on War Mobili- 

 zation, The Government's Wartime Research and Development, 1940-1944 (79th Congress, 1st ses- 

 sion. Washington: GPO, 1945). 



13 See England, A Patron for Pure Science, p. 3; and Robert F. Maddox, "The Politics of World 

 War II Science: Senator Harley M. Kilgore and the Legislative Origins of the National Science 

 Foundation," West Virginia History, 41 (Fall 1979), 20-39. 



