38 



Impact of the Cold War and Korean War on Science Policy 



National security was a major driving force behind U.S. science 

 policy in the late 1940s and 1950s, fueled in large measure by the 

 Cold War and the Korean War. The arms race, which was greatly 

 accelerated after 1949 when the United States lost its atomic mo- 

 nopoly, became an important element in both the Cold War and 

 science policy. Later in the decade, the space race came to wield a 

 similarly large influence. Military strength and national prestige 

 became key elements in the rationale for Government support of 

 science. Military agencies funded about 70 percent of the total Fed- 

 eral expenditures for research and development during the early 

 1950s, thus minimizing the overall impact of the NSF. National se- 

 curity remained the principal rationale for the support of basic re- 

 search throughout this period, even for the NSF. 



One response to America's involvement in the Korean War was 

 the establishment of the Science Advisory Committee (SAC) within 

 the Office of Defense Mobilization in 1951. It was an attempt to 

 provide the White House with overall civilian scientific advice on 

 mobilization planning, something that had been lost with the 

 break-up of the OSRD. 9 



An unsavory side effect of the Cold War was the new Red Scare, 

 or "McCarthyism." Working through the Senate Committee on 

 Government Operations, Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy 

 of Wisconsin held a series of hearings during the early 1950s in 

 which the loyalty of scientists working in government laboratories 

 was challenged. The loyalty of a number of scientists applying for 

 research grant support from the National Institutes of Health was 

 also questioned. Unfortunately, these hearings were sometimes 

 characterized by wild accusations brought against innocent people, 

 and as a result served to create a good deal of mistrust within the 

 scientific community toward the investigatory powers of Congress. 



Few things did more to estrange American scientists from their 

 government than the celebrated and inflammatory loyalty-security 

 case involving J. Robert Oppenheimer. As director of the Los 

 Alamos Scientific Laboratory during World War II, Oppenheimer 

 led the highly successful effort to create the atomic bomb. After 

 the war, Oppenheimer returned to his academic career as a profes- 

 sor of theoretical physics. The popular and influential Oppen- 

 heimer, widely regarded as one of the leading spokesmen among 

 American scientists, also served as a consultant with the Depart- 

 ment of Defense, State Department, and the White House. After 

 the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, he was 

 elected chairman of the AEC's principal scientific advisory commit- 

 tee, the General Advisory Committee. As its chairman, he worked 

 to reduce the nation's reliance upon massive retaliation, advocating 

 the development of small tactical nuclear weapons while opposing 

 the crash development of the hydrogen bomb. 10 



9 See Detlev W. Bronk, "Science Advice in the White House: The Genesis of the President's 

 Science Advisers and the National Science Foundation," Science, 186 (October 11, 1974), 116-121. 



10 For material on the Oppenheimer case, see Walter Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty, and Science 

 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950); U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. 

 Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board (Washington: GPO, 



Continued 



